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ABSTRACT
Military decision problems are growing increasingly more complex,
requiring rigorous structured methods to be applied for superior
solutions and decisions. In many cases the military decision-maker is
faced with a set of alternatives from which he must choose. Rational
and consistant judgement can only be made by attempting to maximize
the military value or utility of his decision. The decision-making
process is described, along with a structured approach to military
decision-making by economic analysis and the application of mathematical
techniques. Some basic elements of measurement theory and utility
theory are dealt with because of their importance to military worth
scales and military worth measurement. The military worth concept is
developed and commented on. The use of psychometric techniques of
introspection and behaviorism and the use of game theory are examined
as possible methods in developing measures of military worth. The
application of military worth techniques to some general decision-
making problems and to some specific logistical decision-making prob-
lems is discussed. Finally, a most important step forward in the




The information presented in this review has been gathered from
many sources and not without assistance. I wish to express my in-
debtedness to CDR Sherman W. Blandin, Jr., SC, USN for his guidance
in formulating the problem and for his excellent advice, without which
I would have been unable to have developed this manuscript. I should
like to express my appreciation for the patience and understanding of
my wife in her typing of the rough manuscript. Finally, I want to







I. INTRODUCTION . . . . 1
Purpose . 1
Importance of Correct Military Decisions 1
Nature of the Military Decision Problem 2
Classes of Military Decisions 2
Basic Structure of the Decision Problem. ........ 3
Decisions of Action . 4
Major Decision-Making Groups ............. 4




Need F)r a Structured Approach to Military Decision
Problems 6
A Structured Approach to Military Decisions:
An Economic Approach 7
Essentially Economic Problems 7
Need For Economy 8
Elements of the Economic Analysis Approach 9
Recognition of the Problem 9
Objectives 11
Alternatives 11





Scientific Approach to Military Decision Problems . . 16
Introduction 16
Modern Tools used in Managerial Analysis and
Decision-Making 16
Precautions in the Use of the Structured Methods
in Decision Making 17
Benefits of the Structured Methods in Decision-
Making 18
Evaluation and Comparison of Alternatives 19
Need for a Suitable Measure 19
Economic Criterion 20
Military Worth 20
II. MEASUREMENT SCALES 22
Scale Values 22




Uniqueness of Scales 24
Types Scales 24
Analytical Potential of the Four Types of
Scales 25
The Importance of Measurement Theory. ....... 26








Choice of A Scale. . . 32
Behavioristic Method 33
Gaming Theory Method 34
Criticism of Gaming Theory Methodology 35
Benefit of Utility Theory to Military Decision
Making 37
IV. MILITARY WORTH AND VALUE. 38
Value and Worth Defined 38
Measuring Value 38
Three Aspects of Value 39
Military Worth: A Subdivision of the General
Field of Worth 40
Military Worth Defined 41
Concept of Military Worth 42
Military Worth and Cost-effectiveness 43
Need for Quantification and A Definite Test
of Military Worth 44
Military V/orth Measurement 46
Military Worth Measurement Errors 49
Military V/orth Applications 50
V. GENERAL MILITARY DECISION PROBLEMS AND MILITARY WORTH. . . 51
Introduction 51
Military V/orth In Relation to Weapons Systems 51
The Problem . 51





Parity Function and the Time Dimension 54
Priority Ladders . 55
Benefits to Be Derived From This Model. ...... 55
Military Worth in Relation to Equipment and
Operations 56
Military Value in Relationship to Military
Game Matrices 56
Micro-and Macro-Military Values 57
Military Worth and Executive Systems 58
Need For Executive System Evaluation. 58
The Problem 58
Military Value Criteria 59
VI. MILITARY WORTH AND LOGISTICS 60
Introduction 60
Military Planning Areas and the Logistics Problem . 60
Material Logistic Commodities Defined 61
Requirements Determination (Deterministic Approach
vs. Probabilistic Approach) ... 61
Role of Military Worth in Logistic Planning and
Requirements Determination. ..... 63
Priorities 63
Basic Problem of the Logistic System 63
Purpose of Preference Systems ........... 64
Preference Systems and Military Worth ....... 64
Ranking Alternatives 65
Priority Preference Schemes 65




A Precaution. ...» 67
Allocation of Equipment by Military Worth Indicies ... 67
Allocation Problem 67
Basic Concept of Aumann's Model 68
Over-all Military Worth Index and Position
Factors 68
Derivation of the Over-All Military Worth
Index 69
Computation of An Optimal Assignment 70
Conclusion 71
Inventory Control 71
Inventory Control Problem .... 71
Objective of the Navy Supply System 72
Readiness and Its Affect on the Capability
of the Navy 73
Echeloning of Supply Support and Factors
Affecting It 73
Cost of Depletion 74
Research Projects Into the Development of Military
Worth Concept 75
Nature of Repair Parts Demand ........... 77
Development of Military Essentiality Codes 78
Results of the Military Essentiality Studies. ... 80
Future Applications 81
VII. MILITARY ESSENTIALITY THROUGH READINESS INDICIES 82
The Problem 82
Readiness 82




Current Method of Measuring Material Readiness 84
A New Approach 84
Method 85
A Step Forward 86
The Heirarchy Structure 86
Absolute vs. Relative Readiness 88
Further Applications 88
Current Status 89
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ................. 91
Summary 91
uonciUoions •«•«•«••« • » « •»••«••••* / -l
BIBLIOGRAPHY 106
APPENDIX A. Outline of a Structured Method of Decision Making . Ill
APPENDIX B. Modern Tools or Techniques in Dealing with
Compex Problems ..... 113
APPENDIX C. Three Factor Method of Logistic Planning 115










The military decision-maker, whose attitudes or behavior satisfy
certain consistency requirements, js faced with the problems of choos-
ing from a set of alternatives, each associated with a particular cost
and effectiveness. Rational and consistent judgement can best be made
by maximizing the military value or utility of this decision. If prob-
abilities are introduced into the decision, then the problem becomes
one of maximizing expected military value. The determination of that
feasible alternative which provides the maximum military worth, value
or utility (preferred or most satisfying) requires the use of military
worth scales.
It is the purpose of this paper to briefly examing the decision-
making process and some associated problems, to show the importance of
using structured decision-making techniques, to discuss some basic con-
cepts in measurement theory and utility theory, to explore the proce-
dures and methods for deriving military worth measures, to discuss the
application of the military worth measures in decision problems, and
finally to briefly survey some general and specific military decision
problems which may profitably use military worth measurements.
II. IMPORTANCE OF CORRECT MILITARY DECISIONS
The importance of making correct military decisions can not be
overemphasized. Livingston has stated that in order to catch up with
the Soviets today, to be ahead of them tomorrow, we need better decision

making in weapons development. Incorrect or poorly made decisions can
lead to imbalances between opposing forces . Too great an imbalance could
be disastrous.
III. NATURE OF THE MILITARY DECISION PROBLEM
Added to the growing and changing nature of the threat from the
Communist nations are a myriad of problems requiring analysis and de-
cisions by the military decision-maker. These decisions are made even
more difficult by the growing economic, political, social and techno-
logical complexities of the world today, which introduce an almost un-
limited number of variables into an already complicated problem. The
consideration of all these variables and the weighing of their signif-
icance on the problem at hand in arriving at a decision is beyond the
ability of the human mind. These problems must be reduced to a manage-
able proportions and feasible courses of action found. Only by attacking
and solving a variety of individual problems can we hope to discern the
2
general patterns to the solutions that we hope exist.
IV. CLASSES OF MILITARY DECISIONS
Military decisions may be classified by kind as well as by level.
Hitch and McKean have found it useful to distinguish the following as
three basic classes of military decisions: operations decisions, pro-
curement or force composition decisions, and research and development
3decisions. Operations decisions may be further classified as strategic,
J.S. Livingston, "Decision Making in Weapons Systems, "Harvard
Business Review
.
Vol. 36 (1958), p. 127.
0. Morgenstern, TheQuestion of National Defense (New York: Random
House, 1959), p. 163.
"
3
C.J. Hitch and R.N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear
Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 131.

tactical, and/or logistical decisions. Strategic decisions are deci-
sions concerning long range, broad, overall planning and
execution, and basic disposition of the resources made available to the
military. Tactical decisions are decisions concerning best courses of
action and the manner of utilizing resources which have been committed
to a particular activity when in direct enemy contact or in immediate
operational support. While each of the above classes of decisions in-
volves different considerations in their use, the basic structure of
the decision problem is common to all.
In addition to the action type decisions described above, other
types of decisions include decisions of understanding, of recognition,
and of enterprise. These decisions are concerned with constructive,
purposive, or creative aspects of human behavior. All are interrelated.
The quality of decisions effects the quality of the organization, the
degree of human satisfaction, and the effectiveness of the organization.
In this review we shall concern overselves only with the decisions of
action.
V. BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE DECISION PROBLEM
The basic structure of the decision problem can be divided into
nine fundamental concepts or parts : sizing-up situations, formulating
policies, discovering opportunities, assessing risks, planning programs
of action, organizing administrative personnel, putting plans into
action, controlling parts of and all of vital situations, or keeping
informed, and finally following up and reappraising previous thinking
4
and actions in the light of unfolding events. Essentially it may be
4
G.A. Smith and C.R. Christensen, Policy Formulation and Admini-
stration (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, 1962), p. XVIII.

though tof as the process of translating thoughts into action.
VI. DECISIONS OF ACTION
Major Decision-Making Groups
The three major decision-making groups, Business, Political and
Military, are all faced with action type decisions. The business
entrepreneur is blessed with the market and pricing system, which in-
corporates a vast amount of information, free, that he needs to know
in order to operate with in the complex world of today. With the help
of this system, a business entrepreneur in a free enterprise system can
compare expected costs with expected sales and profits when he has to
decide which allocation of his scarce resources is better than another.
All are expressed in dollars, or in other words by numbers. The mili-
tary decision maker is not so fortunate as to have such a market system
at his disposal.
Subjective Military Evaluations
Many of the action decisions in the military are determined mainly
by subjective military evaluations. In a great many cases these eval-
uations are made on intuitive judgements based on the intelligence,
experience, imagination, foresight, vision and feelings of the individ-
ual decision maker. Generally, this consists of judgements that are
neither definable nor rigorous, made by military personnel, often using
procedures that are variable. Brock states that,
this does not imply that evaluation methods are without
valu<% However, such procedures require systematization
and substantiation through investigations of measurable




P. Brock, et al. "Techniques for Evaluating Military Organizations
and their Equipment," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly ,, Vol. 9 (1962),
p. 212.

While these intuitive judgements have in many cases proved highly-
successful, it is necessary to supplement intuition and judgement be-
cause of growth problems, difficult to resolve critical factors, inter-
relationships, the numerous courses of actions possible, and the diffi-
culty of evaluating outcomes in an unsystematic manner.
Dynamic Aspect
The problem is further complicated by the element of time* Since
the enemy is making his plans, provisions must be made in one's own
plans for flexibility that will permit timely change to meet not only
the enemies changing plans, but the changing enviroment as well; and
all this without compromising the organization's objectives. The mili-
tary is faced with the problem of developing adequate decision making




The most difficult part of decision making is dealing with the
future. If we were able to foresee the future with certainty then a
great deal of the difficulty would be removed from decision-making.
Morgenstern states that the military is concerned with the problem of
decision-making under uncertainty, where the uncertainty is not of the
simple, well-understood kind to be dealt with by probability theory,
but is of the highly complex nature arising from the strategic moves of
the opponent, who labors under the same difficulty.
The decision-maker must understand the nature of the uncertainties
facing him and how to deal with them in order to improve his decisions.
i^iorgenstern, op_. cit., p. 264.

Uncertainties are introduced by human behavior, changes in environment
,
and actions and reactions of the enemy . Enthoven describes these un-
certainties as operational factors, time and cost to develop weapons
systems, enemy behavior, his weapon systems and forces, the behavior of
7
other countries, and conceptual uncertainties. To this growing list of
uncertainties could be added technological uncertainty, uncertainty of
planning factors, uncertainty about strategic context, and finally
statistical uncertainty (chance element in recurring events).
Efforts in dealing with uncertainty have been made by determing
past frequency patterns and then projecting them into the future, as a
probability of re-occurrence. In most cases facing the military decision-
maker, the uncertainties are not merely statistical, where the fluctua-
tions are the process of a known probability distribution, but are
largely stochastic, or not well understood. Other decision-makers form
in their mind a subjective probability or degree of belief regarding an
expectation. That is to say they make an intuitive judgment.
VIII. NEED FOR A STRUCTURED APPROACH TO MILITARY DECISION PROBLEMS
Clearly, it can be seen from the foregoing that if order and mean-
ing is going to be given to the complex military decision problem, a
systematized approach, tailored to the needs of the military, must be
developed. Morgenstern stresses the need for such an approach in the
7
A.C. Enthoven, "Economic Analysis in the Department of Defense "
(Address before the American Economic Association at Pittsburgh,




We do need guidance. It can come only from combining
experience with a highly developed, proven system of
thought. Loose thinking is seldom permissible , It should
be avoided like the plague in the discussion of our
strategic military problems since the answers we need
affect our survival, individually and as a nation.
The method or methods selected should clearly and simply set fortSKthe
values, effectiveness and costs involved in a proposed set of alter-
native courses of future actions,
IX. A STRUCTURED APPROACH TO MILITARY DECISIONS i AN ECONOMIC APPROACH.
Essentially Economic Problems
A structured approach to problem solving and decision-making,
which has found considerable application in the military in recent
9years, has been developed by Hitch and McKean. They have stated that
National Defense Problems, while eventually requiring a human value
judgement, are essentially economic problems of allocation of scarce
resources among various alternatives to accomplish a stated objective
or mission. Mission implies the selection by an authority of an ob-
jective, usually well defined and which must be reached within a certain
time period, through a chain of operations to be chosen and performed by
the agents in charge of the mission and responsible for its successful
conclusion, in spite of eventual difficulties and obstacles which can not
be well defined at the beginning of the operations. Because National
Fiorgenstern, op_. cit
. , p. 5.





Defense Problems are essentially economic problems they can be struc-
tured by the use of the economic analysis techniques . Economic analysis,
whether quantitative or qualitative, will usually attempt to determine
the utility of alternative systems by examing the effect on military
11
capabilities, whenever these occur.
Need For Economy
A second reason why Hitch and McKean recommended the economic
analysis approach was because within government there is neither a price
mechanism which point the way to greater efficiency, ncr competitive
forces which induce government units to carry out each function at mini-
12
mum cost. Economy and efficiency are two ways of looking at the same
characteristics of an operation. Given a fixed budget or other fixed
resources, management maximizes attainment of an objective or maximum
production by using or combining the resources in an efficient or optimal
manner. On the other hand, if the objective is fixed, management must
economize on the use of resources so that costs are minimized.
It must be realized that economizing does not mean scrimping, for
the more expensive item initially may well be in the long run, with all
other factors considered, the most economical. Economizing does mean
nlbid, p. 132.
12
Ibid., p. 107. Hitch and McKean also stated that efficiency
would be improved by improved institutional arragnement and increased
recognition and awareness that military decisions are in one of their
important aspects economic decisions. They go on to state that unless
the right questions are asked, the appropriate alternatives selected
for comparison, and an economic criterion used for choosing the most
efficient, military power and national security will suffer. It must
however be remembered that economics is only one aspect of the military
decision, ther r are also the military, political, social and moral
aspects to be considered.
8

the combining or mixing of fixed scarce resources at least cost to
achieve effectively a stated objective. Hitch and McKean have stated
that the essential thing is the comparison of all the relevant alter-
natives from the point of view of the objectives each can accomplish
and the costs which each involves; and the selection of the best (or a
13
"good") alternative through the use of appropriate criteria.
Elements of the Economic Analysis Approach
The essential elements of a military problem of economic choice,
whether its solution requires advanced mathematics, high speed computing
equipment, or just straight hard thinking, are the following: an ob-
jective or objectives, alternatives, costs of resources, a model or
14
models, a criterion or criteria, and a value judgment. Added to these
elements should be recognition of the true nature of problem or problems
facing the military decision maker.
Recognition of the Problem
Consciousness of a problem-provoking situation and recognition
of the problem is the first step in the decision-making process. Once
the military decision-maker recognizes the existance of a problem he
must take the following steps: gather information, assess the signif-
icance of what he learns, sort the important >om the unimportant,
trace symptoms back to basic causes, and select out the main thing or
things toward which he is to devote more intensive attention.
^Ibid, p. 118. This statement should be amended to say "the
appropriate economic and military criteria." Certainly any adequate




^Smith, op_. cit., p. XVIII.

By this procedure he should be able to clearly define the right problem
and the critical factors causing the problem.
Several difficulties arise in defining the problem., These are
selecting the context of the problem and making the necessary assump-
tions. With many variables impinging on the problem, it is necessary
to determine those that art critical and make certain assumptions about
the balance of the factors. Also, if a quantitative solution is sought,
further complications may be introduced because some of the critical
factors are immeasurable, requiring additional assumptions to be made.
A word of caution here is that the military decision-maker must shun
reasoning based on untested and unquestioned assumptions that become
self-deceptive
.
The military decision problem must be considered in its proper
scope. Treating broad high level problems by economic analysis may not
be adequate, since we are no longer analyzing a problem with a given
and definite context and with specific equipment. There may not be
clearly defined objectives. Instead, we are trying to design, not
analyze, a system that will operate satisfactorily, in some sense,
under a variety of contigencies that may arise in a future that is seen
only dimly. At the lower levels we have the problem of choosing the con-
text and the elements that will be permitted to vary in the systems com-
pared. Hitch and McKean make this statement concerning the contextual
problem;
The broader the context the less the danger from inconsistent
criteria and the less likely it is that significant spillover
effects will be missed. But breadth of context and any in-
crease in the number of variables ha.ve to be purchased by
drastically increasing the complexity of the analysis, which -,
all this implies in terms of research manpower, expense and time.
^Hitch, o£. cit., p. 129.
10

Spillovers may be defined as the effects (favorable or unfavorable) on
other entities outside the context of the problem by some of the con-
sequences of the solution to the problem.
Objectives
McDonald has described a decision as a choice of alternative means
17by which to move toward an objective. ' The objective may be a single
goal or a combination of several objectives, which may be in conflict.
It is the specification of purpose and goals of men working cooperatively
within the frame work of some type of organization and the actions taken
to achieve these goals which is so important to the foundation of the
problem. These goals or objectives must be clearly defined and they
must be understandable and explainable. This includes setting both
long-range and short-range objectives.
Objectives are not static. The military leader changes character
of the organization by changes or constant adjustment of his philosophy
and objectives to a chaiging environment. It certainly may be said
that the ultimate objective of the military is victory in war.
Alternatives
Alternatives can be looked at from two aspects. There are alter-
native ways of mixing inputs which yeild alternative outputs. Technology
defines the possible input alternatives. Technology can be thought of
as the physical things which are involved in converting an input into an
output of an activity. The rate of technological growth and the current
state of the art are essential factors in National Defense and therefore
to the military decision-maker. This is true because technology defines
17McDonald, Fortune (August 1955), F 3.
11

the possible input alternatives and therefore the output alternatives
which can be placed in the hands of the military for the defense of the
country and countering enemy actions.
Faced with the choice between alternative outputs, the military
decision-maker must predict what his opponent or opponents will do and
what effective actions he can take based on an evaluation of information
concerning possible actions of the enemy. The decision-maker will have
to evaluate the risk of his alternatives in the light of the intelligence
he has on enemy actions. Time, temperament and circumstances may effect
the rationality of the decision.
The economic problem is to choose that input alternative which is
most efficient (maximizes the attainment of the objective with the
given resources) or economical (minimizes the cost of achieving the
18
given objective). The most efficient input alternative is also the
most economical.
The problem facing the decision-maker is: given a set of resource
constraints, how shall they be mixed to give what alternative outputs?
The amount of the resources is controlled by their cost and availability
and by the funds allocated for the purpose to which they shall be used.
The state of the art tells what alternative outputs can be made avail-
able. The better the state of the art the greater flexibility and
options available. The outputs may be infeasible, feasible, economic,
or optimal solutions. The optimal or near optimal is the desired so-
lution keeping in mind that if the decision-making process becomes too
involved and time consuming because the one optimal is sought, then the
18
Hitch, ojd. cit . t p. 3.
12

decision-maker may have to settle for less. The solution selected,
however, should have cost, benefits, and risks balanced and bring about
greater assurance of both short and long range health of the organiza-
tion. It certainly should pass the test: is it "better" than the
other alternatives.
A principle problem in the selection of an optimal solution is
19
sub-optimizing. Sub-optimizing is the problem of optimizing at lower
levels which when put together may not be the optimal solution of the
20
whole. In dealing with lower level problems the overall problem and
objectives must be kettin mind, as partial optimization may bf inadequate.
Sub-optimizing at lowest levels assumes decisions given at higher and
collateral levels. Hitch and McKean caution that while analysis appears
to become more manageable as we move to lower levels, limiting the con-
text, and restricting the scope within which systems vary, has the ten-
dency to cause the inter-related problems to become more formidable the
21
further we move in this direction.
A Model or Models
Models are abstract representation of reality which help us to
•^McCoskey described in PQ
,
p. 170,
optimization as requiring: (1; simultaneoi
), the impossible task of full
iimultaneous consideration of all possible
allocations of one's resources, that is, all possible alternatives and
all possible allocations among those alternatives, (2) consideration of
the probable impacts of all exogenous events (i.e., those not under the
optimizer's contro]^and (3) the maximization, subject to certain initial
constraints, of the utility function of the optimizer.
20 ...
Brooks gives an interesting discussion of sub-optimization on
long-range planning decisions in £30j .
21
Hit^h, 0£. cit., p. 129.
13

perceive significant relations in the real world, to manipulate them,
and thereby predict others. In no case are useful models photographic,
reproductions of reality; if they were they would be so complicated that
they would be of no use to us. The solution to the model will not be
strictly applicable in all its quantitative features; but it will call
attention to the chief qualitative features of the appropriate policy,
the form it will take, and the directions in which it can be expected
22to vary with changes in the underlying parameters. This qualitative
information can be very useful in improving the intuition of the
decision-maker, helping him to organize his data and his direct knowl-
edge, and reducing the field of alternative policies to manageable pro-
portions .
Models may take many forms, ranging from the physical model to the
23
purely theoretical and mathematical. Generally models express a set
of assumed empirical relations among a set of variables. McCoskey has
22
K.J. Arroxv, Social Choice and Individual Values (New York;
John Wiley and Sons, 1951) > p. 18.
23 -
Brooks states in £30J , p. 163, the reason that economic models
can not be predictive, in the sense that physical models are, is that
the fundamental concepts entering into the definition of the state of
an economic system do not obey Conservation Laws. However, if economic
models can not be dynamic, their static relations, given some defi-
nition of value, are always specific and constrained. The model does
bring in explicity the most important constraints affecting the feasi-
bility of the objectives being studied.
14

this to say concerning models of military conflict:
Models of some systems are, of course, extremely difficult to
construct. Probably none is more difficult to construct than
a model of conflict, especially armed conflicts. Here there
is interaction within each system and between the two or more
contending systems. Armed conflict not only produces its own
peculiar tensions, but requires careful study of the things
that are aggregated under the heading of attrition and the
effects of tension and of attrition are the very things which
can not be simulated, except approximately, and then only by
the introduction of historical evidence and theoretical calcu-
lations into the analysis of the data derived from the simu-
lation of the action. 24
Criterion
A criterion is the test by which one alternative output or system
is chosen rather than another. The criterion or criteria selected may
take many forms. It may be a rule, or it may be a measure of some kind.
The criterion may bt factual or value or both. The aim is the selection
of an optimal solution. In many cases application of a criterion may
result in selection of an efficient system, relying on the intuitive
judgment of a well-informed decision-maker to select one of the effi-
25
cient systems in the neighborhood of the optimum.
Selection of an appropriate criterion is a difficult task. The
selection must be appropriate to the level at which the decision is
being studied. It must be consistent with higher level criteria and
ultimately with the welfare of the organization or group in which the
decision-maker is really interested. In developing criteria he is
trying to develop scales of effectiveness.
One method of expressing the criterion is through an objective
^J.F. McCoskey and F.N. Trefethen, Operations Research For
Management (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1954), p. 263.
^^Hitch, 0£. cit., p. 120.
15

function. Generally the objective function expresses the relationship
of the alternative outputs from the model. The objective function is
a function such that a higher value derived from it represents a more
desirable state of affairs from the viewpoint of the organization.
Ideally, the decision-maker would like to have computational methods
which lead to an optimal solution-that is; to the determination of those
values of the output alternatives which maximize the objection function
26
subject to the constraints implied by the model.
X. SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO MILITARY DECISION PROBLEMS
Introduction
A second structured method in handling decision-making is the
scientific approach. A brief outline of this approach is shown in
Appendix A. The scientific approach finds wide application in the
approach to decision problems in the operational area. The efficient
and skilled use of scientific investigating techniques leads to new,
more critical, more refined investigations. V hen problems are stated
intuitively, and the methodology is largely heuristic, the most that
27
can be expected of results are attenuated statistical reliabilities.
Modern Tools Used in Managerial Analysis and Decision Making
Both the scientific approach and the economic approach have had
growing influence in military decision making procedures because of the
growing complexity of the problems and because of the growth of modern
tools and techniques of managerial analysis and decision making. Techniques
have been developed to handle complex problems and to cope with variability
Arrow, op_. cit
. , p. 16.
27
'Brock, op. cit
. , p. 228.
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and lack of information. A good many of the techniques have been
developed through Operations Research Groups with the combined talents
of mathematicians, physical scientists, economists, and social scien-
tists. It is useful to the military decision-maker to know of the
existance of these tools and their possible application. Some of these
major techniques are listed in Appendix B.
XI. PRECAUTION IN THE USE OF THE STRUCTURED METHODS IN DECISION MAKING
Care must be taken in the application of both the economic and the
scientific approaches to managerial analysis and decision-making, par-
28
ticularly quantifying values. Many important variables bearing on
the problem are immeasurable . This unmeasurable data, which can not or
is not quantified, may be disregarded as irrelevant in the application
of quantitative techniques, when it is essential to the problem and
should be incorporated into the solution of the problem. Quantitative
methods may give the appearance of substituting the objective for the
subjective, but do they measure the right things? Weinwurm makes the
following provision in the use of quantitative techniques i
28
Another drawback is that in quantifying factors they become
fixed or constant and disregard the temporal aspect, where time changes
all factors. In any group problems in which a decision depends on in-
formation available and that, in turn, depends both on the decisions of
other people and when they were made, timing quite obviously influences
the over-all behavior of the group; i.e., the problem of static vs.
dynamic considerations. An interesting discussion in this area can be
found in £43, pp. 489-491.
17

Frovided that similar factors represent a large majority of
all those which have to be considered in managerial decision
making and that quantitative data far outweigh non-quantitative
ones, there may be a favorable situation for the application of
the probability concept and of the scientific method in a manner
similar to that in the physical sciences In this way, the
problem can be reduced to a question of fact and thus be de-
cided in each particular instance on the basis of the available
evidence. It may be accepted that there is a proper field for
the application of the scientific method in managerial decision
making just as in the physical sciences. Yet its scope and
significance remains to be determined. There cannot be any
valid presumption regarding the universal and uniform applic-
ability of the scientific method in the field of management. 21?
A more thorough discussion of some of the limitations of the scientific
approach to management decision problems is given in L.60J .
XII. BENEFITS OF THE STRUCTURED METHODS IN DECISION-MAKING
In spite of these limitations, economic analysis and scientific
methods provide useful methods in structuring the decision-making process
for the military manager and provide additional insight into the problems
of decision-making. Mills makes this statement of benefits of structured
methods:
As technical and organizational complexities in the military
increases in the future, the military decision makers will
comes to lean more on such techniques. 1/hile no decision
mechanism can be devised that will completely escape the basic
uncertainties and complexities that plague large problems of
decision, yet a formal analytic system that wil] encompass
many alternatives, and blend the contributions of many scien-
tific disciplines, is steadily being improved. 30
In so doin^, it is hoped that more rational and consistant judgments
will be promoted. However this is only an aid and not a substitute for
'E.H. V.'einwurm, "Limitations of the Scientific Method in Management
Science," Management Science Vol. 3 (1957), p» 229.




common sense and sound judgment. In any event the military decision
maker must continue to examine ways of improving his choice of pay-offs,
his criteria for judging the relative merits of alternative future
weapons systems that might be developed, and the balance of military
31
forces that might be procured.
XIII. EVALUATION AND COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES
Need For A Suitable Measure
Probably the most difficult aspects of the decision-making process
is the development of a suitable measurement or criterion of evaluating
the various alternatives that are available or developed for comparison.
Measurement is the key to success. There is a need for relating the
alternatives to the objectives that the decision maker wishes to maxi-
mize. Criteria are the practical counterparts of, or substitutes for,
the functions which one would like to maximize in choosing among alter-
native courses of action. Criteria that can be used in actual problems
are usually not the function whose maximization is desired; rather, they
are approximate indicators of this function.
The calculation for quantitative solutions based on the wrong
criteria is equivalent to providing answers to the wrong questions.
Unless adequate methods of evaluating criteria and choosing good ones
are developed, quantitative methods may prove more than useless. One
of the main reasons that criteria selections are difficult is the fact
that the decision-maker always deals with incomplete optimization and
sub-optimization.
*u. Brooks, "Choice of Pay-Offs for Military Operations of the




As a partial answer to the criterion problem, Hitch and McKean
make the following statements
Military choice can be a very subtle and complex matter. At
its heart one generally finds crucial issues of criterion
selection, values and intangibles, and of risk and uncertainty
about nature, technology, and enemy reactions. No simple formal
model of choice is likely to be sufficient for a satisfactory
analysis of most real military problems. But it is often en-
lightening to formulate parts of the problems of choice in
economic terms, that is, in terms of discovering the most
effective uses of limited resources. 32
In economic consumer theory under a free enterprise market system the
individual consumer achieves the most effective use of his limited re-
sources if he maximizes his subjective economic utility or satisfaction.
The value or utility of the alternatives available to him are expressed
in the prices and quantities of various goods which he is willing to
buy with his fixed income. The business entrepreneur values various
alternatives by the amount of profits they will return to the firm.
He wishes to maximize profits. Thus in the business world the common
denominator is profit measured in dollars.
Military Worth
.
The military has no such conveniently expressed common denominator.
He can evaluate the cost and the quality of various alternatives, but
he needs a common measure or value to relate the military value of
various alternatives to the stated objectives. In years past little
effort was made to quantify military worth, but developments in utility
and probability theory, improvement of measurement techniques and de-
velopment in mathematical formulations have given added emphasis to the
32Hitch, o£. cit
. . p. 36l»
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possible quantification of subjective data. By questioning and weighting
answers it is possible to develop non-quantitative attitudes into quant-
itative data and thus make it suitable for mathematical representation.
The quantification of military worth measures, along with the
quantification of cost and quality, can promote rational and consistant
judgments. Using these values in conjunction with improved electronic
data processing equipment and programming techniques it is possible to
compute the consequences of thousands of alternatives. The final result
is the selection of better alternatives.
Succeeding chapters will discuss some basic measurement techniques
and a brief review of utility theory. With this as a background we
shall see how military worth scales can be developed and how military
worth measured by these scales. Finally, we shall discuss some general






If we are going to measure military worth, values or utilities, a
scale must be devised to represent these values so that various com-
parisons and mathematical manipulations can be made with these values.
Scales may be considered by the properties necessary for their existence
and by the procedures required to construct them. Measurement scales
may be selected by comparing the analytical potential of a scale with
2
the analytical demand to be made upon it. Two general aspects of
scales may be examined to determine their analytical potential. First
is the operational character of scale values. Second is the descriptive
power or information provided by the scale value,
DETERMINATION OF THE ANALYTICAL POTENTIAL OF SCALES
These two aspects of determing the analytical potential of scale
values require further explanation. Operational character of scale
values is the ability to manipulate the values of the scale by addition
or subtraction and to obtain the value of a group of values. This ability
to use scale values in the generation of other scale values is very useful
and a much desired characteristic of a scale. The descriptive power of
the scale provides information about any individual entity in reaction to
ror a comprehensive study on measurement and consumer utility see
C20].
n}.M. Lady, A Study of the Utility Concept in Economics , Report




another. The information provided by the scale is indicated by the
permissable transformation which may be performed upon a scale without
altering the meaning of the scale value. By this is meant the ability
3
of the scale to provide a ranking of the differences between entities.
MEASUREMENT
Measurement is an abstraction with regard to some attribute or
characteristic of an entity which may be called a dimension. The set
of entities to be measured must be identified by some unambigious rule.
The process of abstration is customarily, although not always, the
ascribing of numbers to the entities and interpretation of the proper-
ites of the numbers as properties of the entities. The general aim of
measurement is to map a set of entities on the real numbers scale in
such a way that, to the greatest possible extend, conclusions concern-
ing the relations between elements of the set of entities can be drawn
from corresponding relations between their assigned numbers. The abil-
ity of numerical properties to represent real properties is called
isomorphism between the numbers and entities.
ISOMORPHISM
Isomorphism is the similarity or likeness between numbers and
entities. Isomorphism is basic to the theoretical formulation possi-
bilities of scales. The graduation qualities of the scale is a problem
of accuracy. The likeness between numbers and entities is developed by
the statement of formal axiomatic structures describing the nature of




existence, and monotonicity which express the relationships of symetry,
consistancy, independence, and intransitivity , The degree of isomorphism
that exists between the entities and numbers should be examined before
numbers are used to represent the entities. Isomorphism is the heart of
measurement theory.
UNIQUENESS OF SCALES
The uniqueness of the properties of a scale is typically charac-
terized by the kind of transformation that may be performed upon the set
of descriptive numbers. Transformation is an operation upon the members
of a scale that yeilds new scale values without destroying the measure-
ment value of the scale. The interpretation and manipulation of the
numbers in a scale is dependent upon the degree of this uniqueness in-
herent to the entities being measured. The manipulation of a scale value
must be defensible as a manipulation of the entity represented. Manipu-
lations which are not meaningful when applied to the subject of measure
can not have meaning when applied to the representative numbers.
TYPES OF SCALES
There are three basic types of scales: nominal, ordinal, and
cardinal. The assignment of values to entities in nominal measure im-
plies only identification, such as solid, liquid or gas. The ordinal
scale is a simple ranking of entities by equality or in-equality such
as we have in a simple priority system. In utility theory, equality
^For additional explanation of these axioms see Q?0^| .
^Lady, op_. cit




and inequality are expressed in the terms indifferences and preferences.
The highest order of measurement is the cardinal scale, which has two
additional degrees of order. The first cardinal scale, called an in-
terval scale, ranks intervals between scale values as well as ranking
the values, such as temperature measures. The second cardinal scale,
called a ratio scale, measures some characteristic of an entity from
absolute zero, incorporates the attributes of the other four scales, and
has the most power to inform of the four scales. A example of such a
scale would be linear measurements in inches and feet. The selection
of any one of these scales is dependent upon the problem for which the
scale is to be used, upon the information which is needec and on our
7
ability to scale or measure the variables in the problem,
'
ANALYTICAL FOTENTIAL OF THE FOUR TYPES OF SCALES
The analytical potential of the four types of scales will be given
only briefly. Nominal scales have no operational potential and are
limited in descriptive power to identification of an entity. Thus the
nominal scale will only classify an object by some property which will
distinguish it from another. The ordinal scale's descriptive power is
limited to comparing entities and its operational potential is at best
limited. Ordinal scales will only rank entities and indicate equality
or inequalities of various entities in relationship to one another.
The interval scale provides the benefits of the ordinal scale and in
addition provides an indication of the differences between entities.
If entities can be represented by an interval scale, then there should
7
Ibid , p. 6.
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exist a unit of measure as part of the nature of the measurement . The
interval between numbers is represented by a difference of these units.
The interval scale can be used to derive relative measures of comparison
and has very useful operating capabilities. The central difference be-
tween the ratio scale and the interval scale is the fact that the ratio
g
scale assumes an absolute zero point while the interval scales does not.
The ratio scale provides the maximum analytical potential. If the mem-
bers of a set can be described by the ratio scale, then the members of
the set will be completed ordered such that entities, difference between
entities, and the distances of entities from a absolute zero point are
known and the various attributes of the numbers can be ranked among
themselves. If numbers can be ranked among themselves, then an interval
between entities can be compared to an entities distance from absolute
zero, and the attribute of uniqueness prevails.
THE IMPORTANCE OF MEASUREMENT THEORY
The military decision-maker, presented with many and varied al-
ternatives, needs methods of measuring the military worth of these al-
ternatives. The problem for the decision maker is this: Given a number
of points representing alternatives which exist in a space whose dimen-
sions are the evaluation or appraisal of the alternatives in terms of
9particular attributes, how are these alternatives to be ranked? Im-





V-.G. Mellon, "Priority Ratings in more than one Dimension",
Naval Research Logistics Quarterly .Vol. 7 (I960), p. 513.
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greatly improve military decision-making. For many years the theory of
measurement was restricted to the special circumstances usually encoun-
tered in geometry, astronomy, and physics, to additive magnitudes, such
as mass or electrical resistance or length. In psycho-physics, psychology,
welfare economics or military worth, analytically potential scales have
been difficult to develop. New mthods are being developed, however. In
psycho-physics, for example, the method of "bisection" has been developed
in obtaining scales for subjective magnitudes such as pitch, loudness,
etc. In the field of econometrics, Morgenstern and Von Neuman have
developed a method of measuring subjective utility. The Morgenstern-
Van Neuman method has found considerable use in the measurement of mil-
itary worth. The psychologist's theory of psychometrics, mental meansure-
ment, has found application in the development of military essentiality
measures for repair parts by a questioning-mission effect technique.
The measurement scales developed compare favorably with the properties
of the interval scale. As these new methods of measurement are developed
and find application in military decision-making, bj giving better ana-
lytical scales, alternatives can more effectively be measured and com-
pared^ and improved choices made.
J. Pfanzagl, "A General Theory of Measurement Application to
Utility" . Report Memorandum No. 5 (Princeton University Economic Re-
search Program, Princeton University, 1958). p. 1.
11
J. Von Neuman and 0. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic







The concept of utility may be related to the phenomenon of choice.
In a capitalist demoncracy there are essentially two methods by which
social choices can be made: voting, typically used to make political
decisions, and the market mechanism, typically used to make economic
decisions. Elsewhere in the world, social decisions are sometimes made
by single individuals or small groups and sometimes by a widely encom-
passing set of traditional rules for making the social choice in any
given situation.
The last two methods of social choice, dictatorship and convention,
have in their formal structure a certain definiteness absent from voting
- %
or the market mechanism. In the dictatorship, there is but one choice.
In the society ruled by convention there is a common will established by
the conventions; therefore, social decisions are not in conflict with
individual wills involved. Choice by dictatorship and by convention can
be rational, provided the individual or conventions are rational.
In a capitalistic demoncracy, social choices are made by amal-
gamating the tastes or preferences of many individuals, which may bring
about short run irrational and inconsistent decisions. This irration-
ality and inconsistency is brought about by the Paradox of Voting,
For two excellent studies on social value and utility theory
see Q") andC203 .
2
K.J. Arrow, Social Choice and Invididual Values (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1951), p. 1.
28

described inFl] • It is difficult to ascribe rationality and consis-
tency to social choice made by collective methods of choice, where the
wills of many people are involved, except perhaps in the long run.
Before an understanding of patterns of social decision-making can be
had. utmost precision and mastery in the more limited field of individual
choice must be gotten. Once these are measured and quantified, methods
of formally constructing a procedure for passing from a set of known
individual tastes or preferences to a pattern of social choices could
3
be developed. The ultimate aim is better prediction of human behavior
and better decision-making.
INDIVIDUAL CHOICE
Habit, custom, tastes, and preference may all be considered im-
portant influences on the choice of an individual. The notion of sat-
isfaction is a particularly important consideration in the examination
of the choice of an individual. Analytically it is at present con-
venient to aggregate all factors contributing to the choice decision of
an individual into the single concept of utility. Lady gives a primitive
4definition of utility as that which determines choice. Be defining
utility in this manner, a quality of the individual rather than an in-
herent quality in an object or entity is being sought. The aspect of
the utility dimension which describes the individual's disposition to-
wards an object may be called preference. An important fact to focus
3Ibid . p. 2.
4
G.M. Lady, A Study of the Utility Concept in Economics . Report




upon is that preference determines choice and not the size of the
number chosen to represent preference.
Individual attitudes are structured. A structured attitude in-
dicates that in the choice of objects there exists relationships between
goods and services that needs to be taken into account. These relation-
ships can be classed as independence, complementarity, and substituti-
bility. Complementarity and substitutibility bring to bear the notion
of a diminishing marginal rate of substitution as a propostion concern-
ing an individuals behavior in relationship to the choice of objects.
The similar relationship of internal feeling or emotion toward the con-
sumption of goods and services is reflected in the notion of the law
of diminishing rate of marginal utility. This law states that satis-
faction or pleasure diminishes as more and more of the unit is consumed.
The ratio scale is the only type of scale that would include information
concerning the feelings of the individual as well as information con-
cerniig his choice among objects.
MEASURING UTILITY
Folsom makes the following statement concerning measurement of
utility:
Notions of utility and worth, or value, of human actions and
material prerequisities have attracted the attention of phi-
losophers and economists in increasing measure since the dawn
of the industrial era. The ideas of worth, utility, and value
have proven difficult to formalize because they are not
"absolute", because they have not yielded to a single scale of
measure, because of countless possibilities of "exchange" or
trade-off in measures of value which vary with circumstances,
and because it has not been possible in most cases to dissociate
moral and social "value" from material values. None the less,
scientists are active in studies of worth and value theory, but
in general their results are still in the initial stages of be-
ing transformed into practical tools for executives.
5
5
P.L. Folsom, "Military Worth and System Development," Naval
Research Logistics Quarterly
.
Vol. 7 (i960), p. 501.
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For these reasons the operational property of the addition of scale
values to gain the scale values of the aggregate is restricted and
generally not considered to be necessarily an available means of con-
structing a complete ordering for a utility function. Only limited
cardinal scales of utility have been developed. Present methodology
does not permit the determining of a ration scale of utility.
The problem of how to measure utility can be approached from two
aspects. First, it can be approached by the method of introspection;
that is by verbal responses of individuals involved to certain questions
.
Secondly, utility can be measured by behaviorism, i.e. it can be mea-
sured by certain actions of the individual. These actions find their
motivating force in the complicated wants and needs of the individual,
which may be physiological needs or psychological needs or most prob-
ably a combination of both. The difficulties lie in properly describ-




Certain assumptions concerning individual behavior or attitudes
are made in developing utility measures. First, the individual's pref-
erences are consistent with the underlying axioms of the scale. Second-
ly, preferences are unchanging over a specified period of time. Thirdly,
an ordinal scale or an interval scale of preference is in some manner
Lady, ojd. cit
. , p. 46.
7
'J. Von Neuman and 0. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1%4)> p. 8.
8
Lady, op_. cit
. , p. 22.
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discoverable, i.e., utilities are numerically measurable. Finally, an
individual will act to maximize his preferences. By this it is meant,
an individual, who has a fixed amount of money, being confronted by the
prices of goods and services will, in spending this amount of money,
select that group of goods and services which will give him maximum sat-
isfaction. He prefers the chosen mixture of goods and services to any
other group available to him for purchase.
CHOICE CONTEXTS
4
In the measurement of utility it is necessary to take into account
three separate choice contexts: certainty , when the outcome of a choice
is known; risk , when a given choice implies several possible outcomes,
each associated with a known probability distribution and; uncertainty,
9
where the form of the probability distribution is unknown.
CHOICE OF A SCALE
The use of one scale rather than another is cetermined by the
problem to be approached and not, in the case of the problem of the
consumer, by whether or not emotion or behavior is to be used as a basis
for constructing the scale. A few brief comments concerning the selec-
tion and use of the various scales in the measurement of utility is
given below. The use of the interval scale makes no implicit assump-
tions about the feelings of the individuals, but instead indicates that
it is necessary for the intervals between scale values to be ranked.
Again, ranking of the interva] values can be achieved by behavioristic
or an introspective point of view. The ordinal scale may, on the other





hand, be supported by assuming that the ranking achieved indicated a
ranking of quantities of internal satisfaction,,
Choice of context will influence the choice of scales . Under
conditions of risk, the choice of an individual does not lead to a
sure outcome, but rather leads to a set of possible outcomes, each out-
come associated with a known probability. In this case the ordinal
scale does not provide enough information to indicate the choice of
the consumer; therefore, the interval scale would be required. Under
conditions of uncertainty, the ratio scale should be used.
BEHAVIORISTIC METHOD
A behavioristic method of determining order of choice would be to
present an individual an array of objects or entities to choose from.
The more difficult the choice, the smaller the difference between the
utilities of the objects to be chosen. Rather than showing preference
for these items, the individual would be incifferent between having one
or the other. An objection to this methodology is that the notion that
difficulty in choice need not wholly be related to differences in util-
ity. A second method used to order differences between utilities is
inconsistency of choice. Presumably, the more inconsistent the choice
between objects the more similar their utility and thus the smaller the
interval between their utility numbers. ' In both cases however, the
choice difficulties may be because the decision-maker posses imperfect
knowledge concerning the objects of choice.
Lady, op_. cit., p. 51.




The Theory of Games, formalized by Von Neuman and Morgenstern,
presents a methodology by which a weak interval scale may be generalized
that would indicate the choice of an individual under conditions of
12
risk. Risk in this case is defined as that choice situation where
an individual is given a set of possible knov alternatives, each
associated with a given probability, whose sum of being realized, equals
one and with the provision that a choice will lead to one of the known
alternatives. Probability may be visualized in two ways, as a subjective
concept more or less in the nature of an estimation or, alternatively,
13
as a perfectly well founded interpretation as frequency in long runs.
Since in the Game Theory Method, probability is used in constructing
an individual, numerical estimation of utility, the latter definition
is used. This gives directly the necessary numerical foothold and ties
probability and preferences together. Finally, the Game Theory method-
ology measures utility with regard to different quantities of an iden-
tical commodity, e.g., of money.
The Game Theory methodology develops the weak interval scale of
utility based on an expected utility hypothesis, which is defined by
12
For Von Neumann's and Morgenstern' s development of the Theory
of Games see 0-^3
13




For each person there exist numerical constants, called
utilities, associated with the various possible outcomes
of his actions, given the external events not under his
control. If, for a given subject, we could know the val-
ues of these constants and the ("personal") probabilities
he assigns to the various external events we can, according
to this model, predict his choice among any available set of
actions: He will choose an action with the highest expected
utility, i.e., with the highest average of utilities of out-
comes, weighted by the probabilities he assigns to the corres-
ponding events. He will be indifferent between any two actions
with equal expected utilities ab-
using this hypothesis, the numerical utility scales are developed by
interrogating the individual concerning the probability of his being
indifferent between receiving a certain sum of money and in playing the
game. Predictive scales of utility are developed from the outcome of
these interrogations. This scale provides the information (unique up
to a linear transformation) concerning the rate of change of utility
with respect to changes in the quantities of goods and services.
Game Theory scales make no statement concerning the individuals
feelings toward an object. Rather, they assume certain rational con-
sistencies in his behavior, namely he seeks to maximize his expected
utility, and the ability to represent behavior through the use of choice
scales.
CRITICISM OF GAMING THEORY METHODOLOGY
There have been numerous arguments and criticism against this
method. The two most serious faults are two underlying assumptions
made in the construction of the scales. First, it is assumed that
^G.M. Becker, M.H. DeGroot and J. Marschak, Measuring Utility by
a Single-Response Sequential Method , Working Report Number 37 Western
Management Science Institute, University of California, Los Angeles,
July 1963), p. 1.
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utilities of various alternatives are independent of one another and
therefore have constant marginal utility. This does not take into
account the law of diminishing rate of marginal utility. The second
assumption is that individuals have perfect knowledge , which in most
cases does not exist in the real world . Other arguments, such as an
individuals unwillingness to play a gambling game because of moral
reasons, the available amounts of money changing the utility function,
or people being unable to deal with finely graduated probability co-
efficients, are leveled at the format of gaining the information
necessary to construct the scale rather than the criteria for construc-
ing the scale.
One of the stronger arguments against the gaming method of deter-
mining utility has been put forward by Arrow. This argument is shown
below:
Even if, for some reason, we admit measurability of utility
for an individual, there still remains the question of aggre-
gating the individual utilities. At best, it is contended
that, for an individual, his utility function is uniquely
determined up to a linear transformations we must sill
choose one out of the infinite family of indicators to
represent the individual, and the values of the aggregate
(say a sum) are dependent on how the choice is made for each
individual. In general, there seems to be no method intrinsic
to utility measurement which will make the choice compatible.
It requires a definite value judgment not derivable from in-
dividual sensations to make the utilities of different in-
dividuals dimensionally compatible and still a further value
judgment to aggregate them according to any particular mathe-
matical formula. If we look away from the mathematical aspects
of the matter, it seems to make no sense to add the utility of
one individual, a psychic magnitude in his mind, with the
utility of another individual . 1"
^For some experimental work in Gaming Theory see F. Hosteller and
P. Nogee, "An Experimental Measurement of Utility", J. Polit. Econ.,
Vol. 59 (1959), pp. 371-404.
^Arrow, op_. cit., pp. 10-11.
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BENEFIT OF UTILITY THEORY TO MILITARY DECISION MAKING
The imporance of uiility theory to the military is that it suggests
methods of determining military worth measures to be used in decision-
making. In spite of some of the weaknesses in developing the utility
scales, they have proven useful and will continue to prove useful in




MILITARY WORTH AND VALUE
VALUE AND WORTH DEFINED
An object or entity has both worth and value. V.'orth is that
quality or sum of qualities of an entity rendering it essential, valu-
able, or useful 4 Value is the estimated or assessed worth, usefulness,
or essentiality an individual places upon an entity by itself or in com-
parison with other entities. Because there exists only a fine distinc-
tion between the terms worth and value, they will be used interchange-
ably. An individual's value judgements may be arbitrary and in a sense
conventions of the time and place. Value is, often influenced by the
worth and imputed importance of the entity. Values or preferences of an
indiviudal are described in his utility function and find their expression,
in the material realm, by the goods and services which he purchases. The
many social and ethical aspects affecting an individuals values will not
be discussed. Social value generally reflects the aggregation of the
values of the individuals composing the society.
MEASURING VALUE
Individuals and societies assess different values to different
entities. This implies two very important elements. First, not all
entities possess the same worth or value. Second, differing values in-
dicate that there must be some underlying method used in measuring value.
Value measurement requires two basic questions to be answered. Who
An excellent discussion on the various social and ethical aspects
of value is presented in £VJ , pp* 404-413.
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or what should be measured? How should value be measured and in re-
lation to what? In the democratic capitalistic society, where egoistic
hedonism prevails, value preferences of individuals, groups, society or
the culture should be measured . Two methods of approach may be used in
developing measures of an individuals values. An individuals values
may be measured by introspection j i.e., values measured only by verbal
responses to questioning of the individual involved. Value may also be
measured by behaviorism^ i.e., values measured by other types of indi-
2
vidual action. Under hedonism, value is measured in relation to the
amount of satisfaction that an entity provides to an individual. Gen-
erally no absolute value prevails, only a relative value developed as
entities are brought into comparison with one another.
THREE ASPECTS OF VALUE
Values may be examined under three propositions. There may be
absolute values, individual or social values^, or historical value
trends. Absolute value is a super-set of values as opposed to values
made in comparison. The absolute value may have that value by intui-
tion or some divine Providence. If we expect the absolute value assump-
tion, then value is given and only requires the development of some
method to measure. An axiom to underlie this would be too weak for
selecting values for military planning. If not given, then values are
measures of certain properties of individuals or groups. In this case
we must determine who or what to measure and how, as indicated in the
2
J.F. McCoskey and J.M. Coppinger, Operations Research For Manage-




previous section. If we don't take values as given and try to measure
them by some method, then measurements are subject to error. A third
proposition of value is that they are not given or determined by specific
groups or individuals, yet are measurable by methods of science. This
4
method generally measures trends in value, not just value itself. It
is a process of a series of approximation leading to truth. The impli-
cation of this last concept of value is illustrated by Churchman's
statement that!
Man not only develops in his ways of doing things, but he
also develops in his interests for objectives. The true
value of an objective represents the ultimate stage of this
interest-development; it is never fully attained and can
only be estimated. . .no finite set of data is sufficient
either to provide the exact measure or the exact meaning
of the measure.
5
A detailed explanation of these three propositions of value is given
in £43 > PP= 401-413.
MILITARY WORTH: A SUBDIVISION OF GENERAL FIELD OF WORTH
Military worth may be conceived as a subdivision of the more
general field of worth and value. Because of this relationship, many
of the concepts developed in the general field of worth are equally
applicable in the study and development of military worth measures.
Some basic concepts of utility and value theory have been discussed in
the preceding chapters and the first few sections of this chapter for
that very reason. The military worth analyst must keep abreast of the
4
Ibid .« p. 409.
5lbid .. p. 410.
P.L. Folsom, "Military Worth and Systems Development", Naval
Research Logistics Quarterly , Vol. 7 (I960), p. 501.
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literature in the general field of worth to take advantage of the ad-
vancing knowledge and technology in this area and to avoid avenues of
approach that are parochial or have led to dead ends.
MILITARY WORTH DEFINED
There is no universally applicable definition to military worth.
Military worth or value may assume many definitions depending on which
level in the hierarchy of the National Defense structure it is being
applied and what criteria see being used to define it. Military worth
may assume different definitions when considered in each of the three
basic military planning areas, strategic, tactical or logistical. At
the national level it may be defined in terms of contribution to winning
or deterring some kind of war, or more broadly of achieving national
security. In this regard, Peck defines military worth as follows:
The peacetime value of a weapon system depends mainly upon
its ability to deter other nations from going to war. In an
aggregate sense, the deterrent value of a nation's weapons
arsenal is relatively easy to define; it is the economic
losses avoided by preventing aggression and war.
At the level of the individual military decision-maker it may be de-
scribed as his preference for, or amount of satisfaction he receives
from having a certain military entity. In this context military worth
and utility are used interchangeably. In the logistics area of mili-
tary planning, military essentiality has been used to define military
worth. Military essentiality is broadly defined as the importance a
repair part, equipment, ship, etc., has in relation to the readiness
of a unit to accomplish its missions. A mission consists of a task
and a purpose; the purpose is usually the organization objective.
'F.M. Scherer and J.M. Peckj The Weapons Acquisition Process; An
Economic Analysis (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1962) pp. 271-272.
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Difficulties arise in the correlation of military •worth definitions
and measurement at high and low levels or in and between planning areas
because of inconsistancy. These inconsistancies may be brought about
by errors and inconsistancies of the military decision-makers, due to
lack of adequate information and the complexity of the problem of mili-
tary worth.
CONCEPT OF MILITARY WORTH
Victory may be gained at too great a cost. Immediately this
brings to mind the concept of military worth or value . If the cost
was too great, what would have been the better or "best" strategy to
bring about victory at a lesser cost? Here, it is hoped, the military
decision-maker would be able to select a strategy or a combination of
strategies "best" suited to his ends on the basis of a set of relative
9
value-graded predicted outcomes. The difficulty is in quantifying
and measuring these value-graded predictions. Military conflict is
not deterministic and it is difficult to put the various mathematical
tools into application in solving the problem. Information is incomplete,
uncertain, and there is great difficulty sorting out and handling mix-
tures of quantitative and qualitative factors.
"National Defense costs too much" . Here again, the concept of
worth comes to the forefront. If this is so, then the values of our
weapons arsenal must be reassessed. The importance of such assessments
8




are stated by Folsoms
The executive who is supervising system development must,
therefore, weigh value and consequences and project the
"military worth" of his product, as never before. Expensive
undertakings face a higher risk of premature obsolescence.
Potential future capabilities of the new system must be
considered in value-relationship to current capabilities.
The existence of constraints, particularly limits in funds,
is a condition which poses sharp questions of value and
military worth in respect to total cost, rate of funding,
competing demands, the capabilities that will be produced
by the effort, and many others. . .best value judgments are
required from the very outset of the venture. "'
Interest in the military worth concept has been sharpened through the
emergency of appropriate analytical tools in dealing with military
worth, through the identification of problems which submit, with realism,
to formal mathematical treatment, and through the growing awareness of
its importance.
MILITARY WORTH AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS
There exists a need to measure the relationship of one weapons
system in relationship to other weapons systems and in relation to the
enemy's weapons systems. Use of the monetary criteria is too limited,
since it leaves out of account the military worth of alternative de-
fense schemes. This is not to say that cost-effectiveness studies and
comparisons are not a step forward, but the methodology needs to be ex-





studies and also indicates one of their limitations
;
The methodology known as cost-effectiveness analysis provides
in some cases an operational substitute for direct value
measurement, given only certain decisions on broad military
objectives. Cost-effectiveness techniques to estimate the
incremental savings which a proposed new weapon system would
afford over existing or alternative methods of accomplishing
the objectives. Such savings reflect the incremental military
value of the program under consideration, as long as the ob-
jective is held constant. It would appear that this approach,
which essentia] ly measures opportunity costs or avoidable
costs, is a tolerable surrogate for military value estimates
in development cost-quality trade-off decisions, although it
is probably less satisfactory in cost-time trade-off situations,
In any event, military value judgments must be and indeed are
made, either explicitly or implicitly by military planners. 1
As a further caution to stressing the monetary aspect of military
decision making, Morgenstern states thats
The first point that has to be made absolutely clear
is that the economy and the economic well-being of
the people are not the dominating concern. Over-
shadowing everything is the safety and survival of
country and nation. ^2
In making rational decisions, the aspects of military worth , cost ,
quality and time must be weighed and integrated into the analysis of
alternatives
.
NEED FOR QUANTIFICATION AND A DEFINITIVE TEST OF MILITARY WORTH
A business entrepreneur in a free enterprise can compare expected
costs with expected sales and profits when he has to decide which al-
location of his scarce resources is better than another. All are ex-
pressed in dollars, in other words, by a common base of numbers. The
individual values are reflected and are aggregated to reflect society'
s
12
0. Morgenstern, The £uestion of National Defense (New York:
T>eck, ojd. cit., p. 273.
Random House, 1959), p. 192
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material values in the pricing system. The market and pricing system
incorporates a vast amount of information, free, that an entrepreneur
13
needs to operate with in the complex world of today.
The military decision-maker has no comparable mechanism at his
disposal. There is no known method of giving a numerical expression
to the military worth of different weapons systems, of deploying forces
to one area instead of another, or of producing more units of one weapon
rather than more of another. Similarily, values attached to the capture
or destruction of straits, fortifications, ships, battalions, etc., as
well as what will be necessary to capture them may in reality be impos-
sible to determine precisely. Additionally, many weapons systems have
not been tried. In many cases, they can not be tried. Their effects
are only estimated for the future. Prospects are not certain. There-
fore, weapon system's assumed military values are not certain either.
In any event, decisions must be made on the basis of some sort of an
idea of the relative importance of the various objectives and the systems
used to accomplish these objectives. Much of the evaluation consists of
judgements that are neither definable nor rigorous, made by military per-
17
sonnel, often using procedures that are variable .
13
Ibid., p. 203.
C.J. Hitch and R.N. McKean, The Economics of Defense_Jji__the Nuclear
Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p.~i63~~
->T.M. V/hitin, The Theory of Inventory Management (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 205.
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Morgenstern, ojd. cit
. , p. 203.
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This does not imply that these subjective evaluation methods are without
value, only that they are necessary . However, such procedures require
systematization and substantiation through investigations of measurable
quantities that can either support, extend or contradict these evalua-
tions .
Morgenstern makes the following statement concerning the need for
improved military value-assessment;
To develop a method would be more important than to introduce
some further, purely technological, advance in some weapons
system. It would improve the use of all of them. Yet without
having solved the question of determining the military worth
of the various alternatives no convincing, rational choice can
be made. Only the usual vague, intuitive appeals to strategic
needs, etc., are possible. -1-5
The objective is to determine the "best" weapons combination that
optimizes military worth subject to the constraints of the problem. No
one knows precisely how satisfaction and military worth are related to
the obserable outcomes of various courses of action; however, if the
objective of maximization of military worth is to be realized approxi-
19
mations will have to be made and quantified on a numerical scale.
MILITARY WORTH MEASUREMENT
Measuring and expressing military worth in meaningful analytical
20
scales is a difficult problem. The techniques suggested in measuring
values and the propositions outlined in the second and third sections
of this chapter are equally applicable in the measurement of military
18
Morgenstern, pjo. cit
. , pp. 205-206.
19
Hitch and McKean, ojg. cit ., p. 160.
20
For the development of multi-dimentional indities of military
worth see £43^ •
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xvorth. The questions, who or what and how, must also be answered in
seeking to evaluate military worth.
There are many approaches in establishing military worth indicies.
Two will briefly be discussed. Firsts individual military decision-
makers military value assessments have been measured by the introspection
method. The values obtained by this method are not an attempt to deter-
mine real worth, since there is, presently, no absolute numerical mea-
21
sure of military worth. The values derived by this method are numer-
ical values, in most cases, which are consistent with certain military
opinions and decisions. The second approach is a combination of intro-
spection and the proposition that value is measurable by methods of
science as discussed under the three aspects of value.
The objective of the second approach is to be able to compute an
index to serve as a figure of merit or military worth measure for par-
ticular means of accomplishing a given mission or objective. Instead
of looking to introducing additional attributes
s
perhaps leading to a
vote, it tries to establish a preference as an explicit function of the
22
original attribute. Such will be done through use of an index which
will be a single number formed by aggregation of the original measures.
There exists some collection of numerical measures relating to perfor-
mance of a mission. From this collection by means of some process such
as selection or combination, it is possible to derive the basic measure
on which an Jndex will depend. The measure should reflect some funda-
u. Suzuki, "Procurement and Allocation of Naval Electronic
Equipments", Naval Research Logistics Quarterly « Vol. k (1957), p. 3.
22
Survey of Command Logistic Problems. (Logistics Research Project,
George Washington University, 1963), Report Serial T-161, p. 3.
47

mental attribute, the more basic the better, since otherwise an essential
23index could hardly be expected to result. •* Also, the basic measure need
not itself amount to an overall figure of merit since this would make
the index unnecessary.
Military worth may also be measured, not as an index or separate
value, but by developing several value measures. Such a technique is
used in missile systems evaluation. Five value factors are compared
when evaluating missile systems? costs, cost on station and surviv-
ability, probability missile gets to target, target value, and some un-
measurable subjective factors. Kith more than one criterion of evaluation,
these criteria may be combined with weighting functions to obtain a com-
posite criterion. These weighting functions may be based on probabilistic
distributions and thus yield expected value measures. Various approaches
and methods can be used in measuring military worth measures depending
on the problem to be approached and the amount of information and oper-
ational characteristics the measure must provide. Two separate authors
writing in the field of military worth have clearly indicated thiss
The proper approach in designing numerical indicators to assist
us in military computation is to first decide which criterion
these methods of establishing the worth scales should meet and
to then design them accordingly, since the degree of measurement
involved in military-worth studies is necessarily limited. **
Clearly, there is no all-purpose criterion, for the appropriate
test depends upon what alternatives are open to the decision-
maker, upon what aspects of the situation must be taken as given,
and even upon what kind of measurements are feasible. 25
23Ibid .
^\'.G. Mellon, "Priority Ratings in More than One Dimension", Naval
Research Logistics Quarterly . Vol. 7 (i960), p. 525.
^Hitch and McKean, o£. cit
. „ p. 175*
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In succeeding chapters several different methods of developing military
worth measures will be discussed in realtion to the particular problem
and the needed value measure c
MILITARY WORTH MEASUREMENT ERi ORS
The real world is non-simple, non-linear, probabilistic, dynamic,
conservative, stochastic and/or irrational. Many of the assumptions
that are made in military worth theory are simplifications that are not
consistant with the real world; therefore, value and worth measurements
are subject to error. To make favorable comparisons of alternatives,
judgements on the value of these alternatives and the risks involved
must be made in relation to themselves and in relation to the estimated
capabilities of the enemy. In estimating values, errors of estimates
must be taken into consideration. Other causes of possible errors are
inconsistency between the correlation of high and low level military
worth, inconsistance in the tests or criteria used to measure worth,
the effect of interdependencies or spillovers when making evaluations
at lower levels, intangibles, and finally the problem of dealing with
time and its associated uncertainties. Even though these error possi-
bilities exist, it is still the aim of the structured method to quantify
military values and to make them objective, so they can be predictive,
descriptive or optimized. At least trends can be seen and measured.
The measure may not be exact or have exact meaning but the trend can be
shown. It can be seen if we are moving in the right direction. Rather
than the absolute or intrinsic worth of an entity we may only be able




Numerical measures of military worth have many advantages and uses,
One of the most important advantages is that symbolic measures can be
manipulated by mathematical formulations. Mathematics is the only
language that can clearly, rigorously, and economically prove the truth
of the results stated verbally in the main body of the text. Systematic
measures of military worth offer these additional advantages: provides
an objective basis for decisions, takes advantage of the scientific at-
titude in the solution of management problems ; and, through disciplined
observation and rigorous proof, may discover new facts and relationships
which will provide new dimensions in decision-making. Military worth
indices can be put to use in many areas, help establish priorities and
direct effort to real problems, help in the allocation of scarce re-
sources judiciously, help in the development of strategies needed for
the deployment of these resources to achieve maximum results, and help
with the tremendous problems of uncertainty and unpredictability which
can not be solved solely on the basis of experience. Succeeding
chapters will discuss some theoretical and empirical research dealing
with the derivation of military worth measures, application of the
measures in decision problems, and general military decision problems
which may profitably use military essentiality measurements.
26
For the development of a mathematical technique of selecting
that weapon system fror a class of weapon systems with a fixed cost,





GENERAL MILITARY DECISION PROBLEMS AND MILITARY WORTH
I, INTRODUCTION
The development and measurement of military worth and value pro-
motes rational and consistant judgements and provides additional in-
sights into the variables affecting military decision making. It is
the purpose of this chapter to show some derivations of military worth
measures and their profitable application to general military decisions.
Three general problem areas are covered; weapon systems, equipment and
operations, and military control systems. As in the last chapter worth
and value will be used interchangeably.
II. MILITARY WORTH IN RELATION TO WEAPONS SYSTEMS
The Problem
Peck makes the following statements concerning the problem of
military value:
We are thus confronted with the problem of military value;
that is, with the need to rank the various time-quality-
cost points of out weapon system development possibility
map in terms of their relative military value. •*
To accomplish this ranking it will be necessary to formulate a military
value function reflecting this relativity notion in conjunction with
corresponding possibility curves of time, cost, and quality associated
with each weapon system. This step is necessary if we are going to make
useful comparisons of alternative weapons systems and decide upon courses
of action. The goal is to maximize estimated military value relative to
J.M. Peck and F.M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process: An
Economic Analysis (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 271.
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estimated development costs. Military value in this case is defined
broadly in terms of the contribution a weapon systems makes to the
2
maintenance of peace or the prosecution of warfare.
Military Value Functions
Peck has proposed the construction of a military value function
based on a comparison of the quality of one nation's weapon system rel-
3
ative to the quality of its rival's systems This is based on the
concept that the military value of a weapon system depends upon the
quality of counterpart weapons possessed by the enemy.
Peck's hypothetical military value functions, shown in Figure 1,
page 53a> are built up from more elemental assumptions about the value of
qualitative parity and the rate at which enemy capabilities are expected
4
to advance. In each of the graphs shown in Figure 1, the abscissa
measures the quality of the rival's systems. A zero reading indicates
that the first nation's weapon system is qualitatively equal to the
weapons of its rival, i.e., qualitative parity prevails. Positive
readings on the quality scale reflect varying degrees of qualitative
superiority and negative readings, varying degrees of qualitative in-
5feriority. Quality values in excess of plus one reflect excess weapon
quality, or an over kill capacity.
The ordinate measures military value. The scale to 100 was




A detailed development of the contruction of the military value
function may be found in£73 # Appendix A, pp. 632-638.




depending in practice upon the absolute payoffs associated with varying
degrees of success and failure in combat. Total unsuccessful combat
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Parity Functions
Three parity functions are shown in Figure 1. The linear function
indicates a straight line quality comparison of disparity between the
two nations weapon systems. The curvilinear function reflects that
qualitative inferiority can be off-set to some extent by quantity, tactics,
etc., but that such trade-offs become increasingly uneconomical as the
quality disparity increases. The two-value parity function demonstrates
a case when the slightest quality disparity between rivals is militarily
decisive. This third parity function illustrates two important points.
First, in some instances a small difference in quality of a weapon sys-
tem can mean the difference between success and failure. Secondly, we
must diversify weapons so that no one weapons progran spoils the dif-
ference between success and failure or between peace and war. As can
be seen, the shape of these function is critical in the determination
of military value measures. Peck states that the shape of the parity
functions cannot be specified further without additional empirical data
on the consequences of various quality advantages in combat and on the
rate at which an enemy is improving its weapons capabilities.
Parity Function and the Time Dimension
The parity functions describe the relationship between two variables,
relative quality and military value. A third variable, time, can be
added by combining the parity functions with some data on expected en-
7
emy qualitative capabilities over time.' The introduction of this ad-
ditional dimension is necessary because a weapon system of any given
Ibid ., p. 285.
7Ibid ., p. 634.
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quality will provide one level of effectiveness relative to the enemy'
s
gincreasing capabilities is constantly decreasing
.
Priority Ladders
Yfeapon programs can now be ranked on a priority ladder according
to their net military value as obtained from the military value function.
From this priority ladder procurement programs can be established „ How-
ever, working with priority ladders in practice is extremely complicated,
since the exclusion of marginal programs from the procurement list may
influence the military value of programs still on the list, causing re-
adjustments in the individual program optima and possibly a further
9
change in the acceptability of programs at or near the margin. Given
the inteneactions between programs, setting individual program and over-
all defense budgets becomes a complex general equilibrium problem.
Benefits To Be Derived From This Model
An intuitive grasp of even extremely simple problems of weapons
selection and procurement is beyond the power of most humans. The model
provides a systematic method for calculating the effects of several vari-
ables, bringing explicitly to light assumptions underlying the analysis,
and providing insights into the problem. Insights have several values.
First, they give a clearer perception of the trade-offs made in weapons
decisions. Second, the explicit recognition of these trade-offs in
actual program decisions may provide substantial benefits in terms of








calculating military value on a parity basis over time leads to the
important conclusion that the United States (as a nation whose values
usually preclude aggression) must be prepared for the worst at all
times by having a diversified inventory of weapons as technically ad-
vanced as possible^
III. MILITARY WORTH IN RELATION TO EQUIPMENT AND OPERATIONS
Militai^^aIue_lji_Relationship to Military_pb,jectives
Whitin has postulated another method of attaching military values
to equipment in relationship to military operations and missions . It
is based on the intimate and intricate relationship that exists between
12
military strategy and military value . " In Whitin's system knowledge of
the relative importance of certain objectives combined with a careful
analysis of strategies available to both one's own forces and the enemy
makes possible a formal evaluation of the worth of items of military
13
equipment in many situations , This analysis of the strategic aspects
of the situation must precede the assignment of a complete set of mili=
tary values to the various equipments.
Game Matrices
The type of formal analysis used in this case is that provided by
1
1
VonNeumann's and Morgenstern" s gaming theory o Game matrices are de~
veloped based on various sets of assumptions concerning the relative
11




ToM Whitin j, The Theory of Inventory Management (Princeton:
Princeton University Press
s 1953)*
13Ibid 0> p. 190.
•^Jc VonNeumann and o Morgerstem^, Theory
_pf Games and Economic
Behavior (Princeton- Princeton University Press,, 1953).
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importance of objectives and opportunity costs. Opportunity cost is
defined here as the cost of foregoing of planes, tanks , or some other
items of equipment for additional items such as ships. The difficulty
arises here in explicitly stating the relative importance of objectives
or missions before military value and subsequently strategies and pro-
duction plans are chosen. In the usual process of decision-making
these assumptions never have to be explicitly stated, yet they must be
15
made implicitly or the decisions could not be made. Having established
the game matrices, parameters can be varied to determine the effect on
the mission or objectives, military values assessed, programs evaluated
and courses of action chosen.
Micro-and Macro-Military Values
Here as elsewhere, the determination of micro-and macro-military
values remains. It is succinctly stated by Whitin as follows?
The problem that remains unsolved here, as in other aggregative
economic models, is whether the system can be reduced to man-
ageable size and still describe the significant relationships
between the important variables of the problem. Macro-economic
problems have to a large extent been neglected in research in
game theory, a micro approach to games being in general use.
Yet, if game theory is to be of use on a national economic
level, the problem of constructing manageable yet realistic
models must then be of extreme importance . 1°
The aggregation of micro-military values to obtain macro-military
values is complicated by the many interfaces and interrelationships in
and among weapons systems. Complementarity exists between weapons. As
a result, incremental military value calculations for one weapon system
17
run the risk of error due to changes in other programs. ' Similar
15
IVhitin, op_. cid. p. 205.
l6Ibid
.« p. 207.
17Peck and Scherer, 0£. cit. a p. 283.
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relationships exist between both the cost and quality dimensions which
further increase the complexity of the problem
IV. MILITARY WORTH AND EXECUTIVE SYSTEMS
Need For Executive JSystem Evaluation
Captain P,L U Folsom has pointed out the need for evaluating and
18
ranking differing military control systems by their military value.
Military control systems are defined here as those executive systems
consisting of central computing elements which are connected to com-
munication circuits of the teletype variety and to displays which show
information in symbolic or alphabetic-numeric form or which provide
printed data The need for evaluating the military worth of these
executive systems was stated as follows
s
The existence of constraints, particularly limits in funds,
is a condition which poses sharp questions of value and
military worth in respect to total cost, rate of funding,
proportions and shares of resources in relation to other
competing demands, the capabilities that will be produced
by the effort, and many others. *'
The Problem
Mellon indicates that, stated in its simplest terms, the problem
of valuing the executive systems is this : given a number of points
representing atternatives which exist in a space whose dimensions are
the evaluation or appraisal of the alternatives inVterms of particular
20
attributes, how are these alternatives to be ranked? The static
18
P.L. Folsom, "Military Worth and Systems Development", Naval
Research Logistics Quarterly- , Vol. 7 (i960), pp. 501-5011.
19Ibid., p. 505.
20
vj.G. Mellon, "A Selected, Descriptive Bibliography of References
on Priority Systems and Related, Non-Price Allocations", Naval Research
Logistics Quarterly, Vol. 5(1958), p. 515.
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problem is difficult enough, but the additional dimension of time must
be considered as it exerts an ever-increasing influence on the worth of
any system.
Military Value Criteria
Folsom suggest a subjective evaluation based on certain value
criteria, rather than a rigorous mathematical derivation of military
value. To assess and compare the military worth of executive systems,
he has recommended that different systems be compared with one another
on various criteria of desirability, such as cost, dependability,
21
maintenance, feasibility, versatility, uniqueness, and so on. This
illustrates that military worth can be derived by many methods and take
many forms.




MILITARY WORTH AND LOGISTICS
I. INTRODUCTION
Military Planning Areas and the Logistic Problem
Military planning covers three basic areas s Strategic, tactical,
and logistical o Strategic planning is long range, board planning and
execution. Tactical planning deals in direct enemy contact and its
immediate operations support. Logistical planning is concerned with
all aspects of military support „ There exists a close interelation-
ship between these three areas . A logistic operation consists in the
supply of definite quantities of physical means and services for activ-
ities that, according to their missions, consume these means and ser-
vices in order that the activities be maintained at particular present
or expected future rates, Morgenstern makes the following statements
concerning the logistic program and the feasibility of certain solutions
to it:
Logistic problem is to identify in detail expected requirement.
After the identification has taken place, the quantities, cor-
responding to the rates of the various component phases of the
activity, have to be computed in such a manner as to make the
entire supply plan an "optimum" (e.g., minimizing time, or
costs, or tonnage used, etc., or combinations of these), under
the constraint that the desired rates should be met-within
stated time limits-with some specified probability. The comp-
utation will show whether the activity can actually operate,
i.e., whether its operations are feasible at the desired rates.
2
1
0. Morgenstern, "Note on the Formulation of the Theory of Logis-
tics", Naval Research Logistics Quarterly




Material Logistic Commodities Defined
Material logistic commodities may be defined as the following basic
logistics items and functions? general supply items, medical supplies,
technical repair parts, fuel, ammunition, and the maintenance and repair
functions. As in the case of any lcgitic commodity, there are problems
of estimating pure requirements; determining best or at least accept-
able stock levels and resupply requirements to meet strategic arid tac-
tical needs; identification of constraints and their explicit inclusion
in the determination of stock levels; the evaluation of strategic and/or
tactical capabilities in light of commodity availability, etc.--5 The gen-
eral problem areas are very similar if not identical over all commodity
areas; however, some specific and detailed problems vary from one commod-
ity to another.
Requirements Determination (Deterministic Approach vs. Probabil. stic-
Approach)
Determination of requirements is at present based on a determin-
istic approach rather than probabilistic approach. Current methodology
uses the three factor method shown in Appendix C, originally developed
by the Log: stic Research Project, George V/ashington University. The
Three Factor Method is a device used in logistics planning which in-
cludes a systematic format with compilsd and refined planning factors
for its use, and which makes explicit quantitative use of command judge-
ment both in estimating requirements and in transmitting these estimates
io other echelons.
3
Logisti B Research Project, George Washington University, Survey
of Command Logistics Problems (Report Serial T-161, 1963), pp. 1-2.
^C. Stein, "Briefing on the Logistics Research Program of the
Navy", Naval Research Logistic Quarterly. Vol. 5 (1958), p. 227.
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The Three Factor Method is not a good model for determine require-
ments . The method does not consider the relative importance of different
commodities, constraints (such as cost weight, space, etc , which depend
on the context of the problem and objectives) of stocking various com-
modities, and no reflection of size of the variance or deviations from
the expected requirement for each commodity are provided for. Addition-
ally, uncertainty associated with almost all logistics problems is not
adequa ely provided for in the Three Factor Model. If "best" stock
levels are to be determined, the concept of military worth and risk and
their associated measurement's must be considered , A suggested factor
method of dealing with these problems is shown in Appendix D. For con-
venience this method will be called the Four Factor Method. Losses are
associated both with under and overstocking. Understocking has losses
reflecting a strategic value or military essentiality. Overstocking
has similar losses associated with it due to constraints of the problem,
such as funds, space, weight, etc., which might otherwise have been used
in providing other essential commodities The Four Factor Method de-
velops these values. The stocking objectives for the basic commodities
may then be to minimize an expected loss function which includes losses
due to understocking and overstocking and the associated probability of
each. ^ Further complications come from different kinds of ships, dif-
ferent kinds of missions , usage rates, initial outfitting and reorder
quantities and points, substitution possibilities and trade-offs, re-
supply system requirements, stock levels, and procurements.
5
Logistics Research Project, eg. cit
„ „ pp. 16-17,
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Role of Military Kgxth in Logistic JPlanning and Requirements--
D et e;rnariation
Military worth or essentiality plays an important role in logistic
planning and requirements determination . The remainder of this chapter
will deal with some specific military logistical decision problems
which may profitably use military essentiality measurements in their
solution. The basic areas covered will be priority indicators, allo-




Basic Problem _g_f_the_ Logistics_ System
A basic problem of the logistics system is clearly defined by
Mellon as follows:
Among the problems encountered in the design of an optimal
military supply system, the question of an efficient priority
or allocation system looms as one of major importance , This
has been generally recognized by serious students of military
supply, since the breakdown of priority systems has proved a
major source of difficulty to the military in past emergen-
cies<,°
Priorities can be taken to mean all indicators of relative desirability
or preference no matter what degree of measurement they contain-that is,
whether they represent a simple ordering of alternatives, an ordering
on the simple or compound distances between alternatives, or a numerical
scale (ordinal or cardinal) which is applied to the alternatives. A pure
priority system is one which has no quantitative restrictions on the use
6
W.G. Mellon, "A Selected, Descriptive Bibliography of References
on Priority Systems and Related, Non-Price Allocations", Naval Research
Logistic s Quarterly, Vol. 5 (1958), p. 17° In addition to providing a
comprehensive bibliography on the priority problem, Mellon also auggests
a method for the combination of money and military worth or utility of
projects within the frame work of the theory of games in dealing with
priority and allocation problems.
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of the priority indicators „ In this section preference systems with a
quantitative element will be referred to as allocation schemes and




Purpose of Preference Systems,
The purpose of any preference system is to provide a method of
more efficiently utilizing scarce resources . To quantify preference
systems through the use of military worth indicies would help to better
the allocation of resources . Young stresses the importance of such
quantification in the following statements
An optimum distribution of materials can be achieved only
through some quantitative system of allocation. Therefore,
to insure that all direct and indirect resources are used
in the most efficient manner , some quantitiative elements
must be introduced into the priority scheme. The quanti-
tative allocation is necessary and sufficient for the in-
suring of the optimal utilization of all resources."
Less than optimal delivery detracts elsewhere from the system. Young
goes on to state.
If we can now demonstrate that there must be a quanti-
tative element in the solution of the problem of al-
locating the direct resources of the-sacstem, we will have
shown that any system of (non-quantitative) priorities is
inadequate for the task of controlling resource utilization^
whether one approaches the problem from the side cf direct
or indirect resources »°
Preferences Systems and Military Worth
Preference systems and military worth are inextricably entwined.
By using military worth measurement techniques a weak interval scale
7
W.M. Young, "Priorities in the Naval Supply System", Naval
Research Logistics Quarterly, Vol. 1 (1954), p. 19.
8




of preference can be developed. The main interest, rather than opti-
mization^ which may not be possible with the present state of the art,
is improvement in the handling of military logistic problems.
Ranking Alternatives
Military Logistical problems have various alternative approaches,
whose payoffs are not single values^ but a set of vectors. It is neces-
sary to rank these alternatives by some degree of measurement. The prob-
lem is to rank alternatives represented by a number of points whose
dimensions are the evaluation or appraisal of the alternatives in terms
10
of particular attributes. Mellon states that just as the number of
pieces of information necessary to yield a complete order increases ra-
pidly as the number of dimensions and the degrees of measurement in each
dimension increases, so does the strength of the criteria needed to ob~
tain a complete order of the alternatives
.
Priority Preference Schemes
Measurement and development of priority schemes using military
worth scales, at least to the order of ordinal ranking, can be devel-
oped by the method of introspection „ By direct questioning of com-
petent personnel in relation to the effect alternatives have on a
mission, a measure of the relative distances between the attributes
of alternatives in particular dimensions can be obtained . Care must be
taken in attributing to these numerical scales more information than
they really possess Ordering does not, and can not, establish a con-
tinuous meaningful numerical scale for the alternatives j meaningful in
Mellon
a





the sense that it can be said that one alternative is such and such a
percentage greater than another . Ordering will indicate a single "best"
alternative from a group and prove satisfactory for use as a priority
preference scheme.
Allocation Preference Schemes
A method of developing allocation preference scales reflecting
military worth of various components was suggested by V'hitin in which
it is imagined a military game exists in which certain of our forces
12
are opposed to forces of the enemy . The value of the game to us can
be calculated, as well as the additions to this value which result from
having additional forces in action . Thus we have a numerical measure
of the military value of a particular weapon or unit in a particular
position which was directly derived, rather than having been determined
by the question method and which can be used to guide civilian produc-
tion, to determine the relative emphasis to be placed on the production
13
of various sorts of weapons , and so on. Little can be said about the
solution of the game by mere orderings of objectives by the competing
parties. But a comparison of the sensitivity of the outcomes of the
game to changes in the matrix of coefficients compared with the degree
of measurement which we possess on the ranking of alternatives by the
competing parties may yield us important results. The values, in
terms of which maximization of results or minimization of cost is to be
accomplished, lead to the establishment of allocation preference schemes
t.M. V'hitin, The Theory of Inventory Management (Princetons
Princeton University Press, 1953)
»








Since priorities can be set and sometimes have to be set simul-
taneously at different levels of the heirarchy, contraditions and in-
consistency can easily develop*
III. ALLOCATION OF EQUIPMENT BY MILITARY WORTH INDICIES
Allocation Problem
The allocation or assignment problem is one of the more important
logistical problems requiring solution „ Aumann states the general
allocation problem briefly as follows §
We are given a system with a number of vacant positions and
and equal number of available parts „ We know how well each
part performs in each position; we wish to assign the parts
to the position so that system performance is optimized.
Applications range far and wide, from employment, to air-
craft assignment, to naval overhaul programs. -^
We shall concern ourselves with the specific problem of procuring and
allocation of electronic equipment for ships. The problem is complex
and involves hundred of ships of various classes and many available
types of equipment . All kinds of complex relationships exist within
and between the ships and the equipments., Because of the expense and
dangers involved, haphazard or inefficient allocation plans should be
replaced with a more systematized approach. A systematic analytical
technique for obtaining acceptable allocation plans has been developed
by Aumann and oifers working for the Princeton University Research Team.
-*RcJc Aumann and J.B. Kruskal, "The Coefficients in an Allocation
Problem", Naval Research Logistics Quarterly Vol„ 5(1958), p. 111.
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Only a brief discription will be given. For a more detailed presen-
tation see Q26J , L,2?j s and pTJ .
Basic Concept of Aumann's Model
The basic idea of this model is that values or weights are assigned
various factors and by combining these weights a numerical military value
coefficient is developed for each possible way to assign each available
equipment model. The method of assigning equipment models is varied
until the sum of weights corresponding to the assignments was maximized
by use of linear programming techniques
.
The task of solving this large complex allocation problem is con-
sidered to be composed of two separate jobss the combinatorial or
mathematical job and the naval judgment job. The method does not re-
place qualitative naval judgement, but simply finds a more effective
17
way of using it.
Over-all Military Worth Index and Position Factors
The development of acceptable allocation plans gives rise to the
need to develop an index which combines the variables and reflects the
value of allocating the various pieces of equipment to certain ships
or positions. The index is called the over-all military worth index.
To develop this index and to reflect the complex interrelationships
between positions, three basic notions or position factors were used.
The basic notions are priority (MIP Weight), state (Utilization of
J.W. Smith, "A Plan to Allocate and Procure Electronic Sets by
the Use of Linear Programming Techniques and Analytical Methods of
Assigning Values to Qualitative Factors" , Naval Research Logistics
Quarterly
, Vol. 3 (1956), p. 155.
17
Auman and Kruskal, o£o cit .




Features Weight) , and goodness (Improvement Weight), Priority refers to
the intrinsic importance of the mission which a position is to fulfill
.
State refers to the model that is already installed in the position in-
question. Goodness refers,, roughly speaking, to the suitability of the
various models to the position inquestion.
Derivation of the Over-All Military jjforthJEndex
An elementary description of how the over-all military worth index
is derived follows. The MIP weight is developed by use of a directive
from Chief of Naval Operations , called the Material-Improvement-Plan,
and by use of a rank-ordering decision technique of questioning a board
of naval officers . From these decisions a mathematical function is de-
veloped by which a quantitative value for military worth is determined.
The concept of goodness is in reality associated with p; irs consisting
19
of a model and a position,, rather than just with positions. The im-
provement weights of the goodness factor are developed by a questioning
technique requiring only a yes-or-no decision from an officer, or a
20board of officers, responsible for making allocation decisions.
Questions must be phrased as realistically as possible to present actual
situations which the Board can readily picture, so as to make it as easy
18
Re Jo Aumann, "Assigning Quantitative Values to Qualitative Factor
in the Naval Electronic Problem", Naval Research Logistics Quarterly
,
Vol. 6 (1959), p. 2.
-*-
°Ibid
. , p 3.
^^Experiments showed that inconsistencies in answers of the Board
were of a very minor nature when aggregating results. One of the basic
assumptions in this method is that it is assumed you can go from small
allocation problems to more complex allocation problems by a mathematical
function. For additional assumptions see ("261 and [27J o
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as possible for the Board to consider all relevent factors in arriving
at a decision,, Decisions are made in response to hypothetical allo-
cation problems of a very small size, usually involving no more than
two sets of electronic equipment and two possible ships to which they
could be assigned o Because of the small size of the problem these
officers will be able to reach a decision solely on value judgments,
experience, and knowledge. The utilization of features weight is ob-
tained in a similar manner based on models of equipment already installed
in the position before contemplated allocation, but because of practical
and theoretical objections it is not included in the formulation of the
over-all military worth index.
The over-all military worth index is developed by multiplying the
MIP Weight by the Improvement Weight. The multiplicative function is
used because it is better suited for equipment'^ssignment. If the addi-
tive function were used, it would develop that if a very valuable piece
of equipment were assigned to a worthless operation, the value of this
assignment would be the value of the equipment itself, whereas the as-
signment should be valued, zero. The process of multiplication, on the
other hand, introduces the concept that the value of the equipment and
21
of its location have special internal relationships.
Computation of An Optimal Assignment
The indicies thus developed are used as matrix coefficient s in the
computation of an optimal assignment problem by linear programming,
where constraints are imposed by the number of each type of equipment
which is on hand and/or may be purchased out of a limited budgetary
^-"-Aumann, ojd. cit .„ p. 4.
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appropriations,, Aumann proved by experimentation that using this method
developed an allocation plan that was deemed superior to the one that
22had been obtained by purely subjective hand methods
.
Conclusion o
Subjective problems of the kind considered here can have no unique
correct solutions „ The technique outlined in just a way to go about
finding acceptable allocation plans , The purpose of the method described
is not to replace the system of military command by a mathematical sys-
tem; it is to transform a command decision which^ because of its enormous
complexity^, must now be made on a largely haphazard basis , into a set of
less complicated command decisions , each of which can be decided intel-
ligently on the basis of the military judgment and experience of the
deciding officers . Thus quantitative decisions on a high level are based
at least in part on subjective qualitative decisions on lower levels.
IV. INVENTORY CONTROL
Inventory Control Problem
The inventory control problems facing the Department of Defense
are knotty problems and in many cases have no well-defined solution,
Whitin describes the nature of the problem as follows 2
22Aumann and Kruskal^ op, oit„ 5 pp„ 122-123,
71

"These problems , aside from being more complex than those
encountered by the ordinary entrepreneur , are also consider-
ably more difficult than those met by most other types of
non-profit organizations . The extreme uncertainty of the
situations that may arise, with respect to time of origin,
duration, and even the nature of events, is almost with-
out parallel in other enterprises , institutions , and
agencies. There are intricate interactions of the decisions
and these interactions will themselves vary greatly with
the assumptions made as to the nature and timing of future
event So "23
The inventory control problems of the military are complicated further
by the size and complexity of the military organization, by the tre-
mendous number of items being managed and by the extreme volatility of
the demand (caused by changes in enemy and own strategies, changes in
quantity and quality of equipment, etc.)
.
Preceding the solution to these problems is the decision of what
is to be maximized . It can be stated that the Department of Defense
desires to maximize the probability of victory or to maximize the de-
terrance of war, although such statements have little meaning except
when considered together with the cost aspects. Before any important
military decisions on inventory levels are made, certain basic assump-
tions must be made about the probability of war, the time and duration
25
of the war, and the probable location and nature of the war.
Objective of the Navy Supply System
The first step in the solution of the inventory control problem is
to state the objective. Mills indicates that the objective of the supply











capability of the Navy to destroy enemy targets in war.
Readine ss and It s__Affect on the Capability of the Navy
One of the essential elements in the capability of the Navy to
destroy enemy targets in war is the readiness of weapon systems. Read-
iness of equipment within the weapon system depends on the reliability
27
and maintainability of the equipment.*" Reliability is a function of
design, and maintainability is a function of both supply and maintenance
Thus j, if important items of equipment are not available when needed,
the capability of the Navy may be greatly reduced. Availability of
essential equipment has two aspects, i.e., it may not be available be-
cause of breakdown., or it may not be available because it is located at
other than the requiring activity. The lack of immediate or extremely
rapid accessibility of some items of military equipment or repair parts
could in some cases be as bad as its non-existence and could cause
consequences of an extremely grave nature.
Echeloning of Supply Support and Factors Affecting It
The capability of the Navy could be improved by proper echeloning
of the material inventory. This is true because the closer an item is
to the end-user, the less elapsed time there is in filling the user's
order, consequently there is an increase in readiness. From the point-
of-view of a ship, the levels of supply support, proceeding away from
the end user in time, are; on board support, mobile support, advance
26H.F. Mills, "Let's Cut Out the 'Sales 8 Talk", Newsletter
(October 1962), p. 8.
27h„F. Mills, "What is the Logic in Logistics", Newsletter
(February 1963 ), pp. 20-23.
28Vhitin, o£. cit., p. 173.
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base support, Navy Retail Support, Defense Supply Agency Support, and
29
finally manufacturer support.
There are several interrelated factors in addition to time affect-
ing the level at which supply support is given . The first two factors
are shelf-life and obsolescence, The next factor is the need for dis-
persion of military supplies to reduce vulnerability to attack . Another
factor is the usage rate. Generally, the higher the usage rate of an
item the closer to the end user should be the inventory support. An-
other factor is the cost of the item in inventory,, Budget constraints
improse restrictions on the amount of items that can be held in inven-
tory. The final factor is the cost of depletion, i.e*, the cost of not
having an important item of equipment available when needed . If it were
possible to develop cost of depletion and the probability of depletion
then optimal inventories, thus increased readiness, could be developed
by equating carrying charges on the marginal unit of inventory of each
30item to the probability of depletion multiplied by the cost of depletion.
Cost of Depletion
Cost of depletion brings into the inventory problem the concept of
military worth or value. Whitin indicates that even a rough estimate
of military worth and cost of depletion would improve inventory controls
29Mills, "Let's Cut out the * Sales 8 Talk", og. cit., p. 10,
30whitin
a og. cit o, p. 186.
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To calculate the costs of depletion, much more would have
to be known about the problem of military values, but the
present system could probably be improved by dividing items
into only a few major classes with varying importance at-
tached to depletion o For example
,
goods might be divided
into categories where depletion was of vital importance.
Probability figures could then be assigned to each of these
major categories, reflecting to some extent these varying
degrees of importance. The introduction of even such a
crude system into the Navy would certainly lead to the
establishment of inventory levels more in accordance with
the strategic importance of various items. 31
Failure to do even this rough approximation of the importance of inven-
tory items is to implicitly postulate that all items in an inventory
32
system are of equal worth under all situations. Because of the very
close connection between the inventory problem and the problem of mili-
tary worth or strategic value.,, there exists a need for a concept and
measurement of military worth.
Research Projects Into the Development of Military Worth Concept
A major portion of the research into and information developed on
the concept and measurement of military worth in the development of
allowance lists has been by the Logistic Research Project, George
Washington University, under the supervision of the Bureau of Supplies
and Accounts « The title of the program is Allowance List Test Program
(ALTP). Past orientation of most of the effort has been the problem of
logistics support for small independent combatant units (e.g. submarine
,
ship, or aircraft squadron) <> A complete review of the work of ALTP is
beyond the scope of this paper j however, some of their conclusions and
their basic procedures in the application of military worth measures
31Ibid. 8 pp. 186-187.
32Hc Solomon, "The Determination and Use of Military Worth Measure-
ments for Inventory Systems" , Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, Vol.
7 (I960), p. 529.
15

will be discussed o A comprehensive review of the projects in this area
is available in Ql6J
, C39J » and \J>(n «
A second major study in this area has been conducted by the Rand
Corporation in the development of fly-away kits. The principal ob-
jective of this program was to maximize the military worth or essen-
tiality of items to be stocked in a fly-away kit for a given operational
period, subject to either a weight or cube constraint,--^ The military
essentiality of the item was based on the relative importance and affect
of a shortage of a particular part on the mission of the aircraft = A
questionnaire approach was employed to obtain the information on mili-
tary worth. The Rand questionnaire asked the affect of a part shortage
on the mission of the aircraft , Psychometric scaling techniques were
used to combine the judgment of several experienced maintenance men to
categorize spare parts according to their essentiality . The numerical
value of essentiality thus derived was combined with expected demand of
an item by a multiplicative function and with weight to develop the
quantities of the items to be contained in the kit. For a more detailed
description of Rand's procedure in developing the fly-away kit see [~37j
and [~53j| . The same procedure developed here can be used in the con-
struction of other supply tables for spare parts such as those prepared
for vehicles.-^
A third project is being conducted by Clark , Cooper, Field and V.Tohl^,
Incorporated, under the direction of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts,
It is entitled Military Essentiality Through Readiness Indices and will
33Ibid., po 530.
3%, A. Geisler and H„W. Karr, "The Design of Military Supply Tables
for Spare Parts", 0perations_Re5ear_?h s Vol, U (1956), pp. 431-442.
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be discussed in a succeeding chapter. Basically METRI relates readi-
ness to the fleet with its supporting items in simulated form to provide
important decision-making information on problems of military essen-
tiality and readiness. The ultimate objective is to get intelligence
regarding the readiness of force units at any one time, how readiness
might be improved, and the extent that individual components effect
readiness. While not the ultimate, METRI is a significant step forward
in the development of the military worth concept.
Nature of Repair Parts Demand .
Initial investigation by ALTP into the nature of repair parts demand
was an attempt to find a meaningful operational variable to which usage
rates could be related. It was found that the operational variables
used (e.g. , hours underway, engine miles steamed, etc.) could not be
significantly related to usage. ' ^ Indications are that the opei*=
ational variables used were too gross. Additional studies showed that
demand for individual items aboard ship was extremely low and sporadic,
that there was practically no commonality of usage between individual
-^H„ Solomon, A Summary of the Logistics Research Project 1J s
Experience with Problems of Demand Prediction,, Report Serial T-139*
(Logistics Research Project, George Washington University, 1962), p. 5.
3oconcerning the relationship of operation variables to usage,
Geisler in £30 points out that demand for parts is not proportional
to the activity level, but rather varies according to some probability •
distribution. These probability distributions have the general
characteristic that the lower the average deman for the part, the
greater is the relative variability of demand. Therefore
>
if the
objective is to achieve maximum supply support from a given size
inventory, it takes proportionately more units of a part to secure a
given amount of protection against excessive demands at lower average
demand rates than it does at higher demand rates. For a brief ex-
planation of the more commonly u,sed probability distributions see
77

ships in terms of actual items used, that the same ship in different
time periods experienced demands for different items , and finally that
approximately 75 percent of the items in the population (i.e . installed
37
and deemed wearable) were not demand at all over a four year period.
Based on these results, it seemed that the situation was one of uncer-
tainty, as distinct from risk where some probability distribution may
38
be assumed. Given the observed high degree of uncertainty of demand,
in particular the highly sporadic nature of demand , how to handle or
control this condition for stocking policies was considered to be the
39
most important problem. Because of this observed nature of demand.,
it was concluded that the decision as to the range of items to be stocked
should receive greater emphasis than the determination of the depth of
each item to be stocked,, First consideration should then be given to
determining the range of items which are necessary for the operation
40
of a mission. This led directly to the study of military worth.
Developmentof Military Essentiality .Codes
The approach used by ALTP to develop military worth measures was
to ask questions on two levels, each representing a separate questionnaire
.
37hoHo Marlow, "Some Accomplishments of Logistics Research 1 ' Naval
Research Logistics Quarterly,, Vol. 7 (I960), p. 308.
-* Solomon, "The Determination and Use of Military Worth. ,. a "op.
oit.
. p. 530.
-"Solomon, Report Serial T=>139 s o£. cit «, p„ 6.
^Solomon, "The Determination and Use of Military Worth...." og.
^ For an excellent presentation on the development of questionnaires




One questionnaire, called the Maintenance-Potential Questionnaire, was
directed at learning the effect of a part shortage on the component in
which it is installed and was answered by technical personnel. The
second questionnaire, called the Mission Effect Questionnaire, was used
to determine the worth of the component to the mission of the ship and
was answered by command personnel » The worth of a spare part, then, is
a function of its importance to the parent component and, in turn, the
i p
importance of that component to the ship's mission. The values were
kept in the ordinal scale and stocking policies developed on these
ordinal values or military essentiality codes The objective was to
maximize the endurance of a ship, i.e., the capability for sustained
operation independent of logistical support other than by underway re-
plenishment or other routine ways which do not interfere with the ship'
s
ability to carry out an assigned mission. Similarly the objective
could be considered as maximizing the vessel' s effectiveness for carry-
ing out a mission while being completely independent of all external
logistics support.
y t p
Solomon, "The Determination.....", og. cit .
^Ibidc, p. 531. Solomon 'makes an important observation in the
evaluation of the inventory model and procedure using ordinal measure.
He states that the evaluation is highly sensitive to the manner- in
which "worth" information is treated . For example, if arbitrary
numerical values are employed, the evaluation of a model will be
strongly dependent on these numerical values. With different nu-
merical values, a particular inventory policy may appear better or
worse than another. He continues by stating that an ordinal system
of worth measurement presents difficulties in the process of model
evaluation. For example, there remains the question as to how many
low-worth shortages are equivalent to a moderately high-worth shortage.




Results of the Military Essentiality Studies .
Three significant results developed from the studies on military
essentiality by ALTP. The first was a verification of the point that
not all items are of equal importance or have the same military worth.
For example, an evaluation of the Polaris submarine USS George Washing-
ton revealed the fact that only 15 per cent of the equipment and com=
ponents were evaluated as having relatively high essentiality and only
11 per cent of the repair parts were in the same category. Other
studies indicate similar results , i.e., the over-all average of repair
in
parts falling into the lower worth categories was 66 per cent. A
second result was that something specific can be done concerning mili-
tary worth and that it need not remain as one of the intangibles in
military inventory problems.
The third result was that the Chief of Naval Operations, recognizing
the practical applications of this method, directed fleet wide implemen-
tation of the Military Essentiality Coding (MEC) program in November 1962.
Shipboard decision-makers will utilize MEC to determine the priority of
' preventative maintenance schedules, to determine the priority of planned
overhaul work requests, to evaluate casualty reporting, to evaluate repair
^For specific studies and results on the application of military
essentiality coding to various combat units see the references indicated
beside the units as follows; Ships Q-8J \ Polaris submarines £l^T) ,
(22] , £28], [44], £63] j and aircraft Ql?] .
46 ,W.To Meyers, "Military Essentiality Coding", Newsletter (September
1963), p. 9.
^'M„ Denicoff, et al„, "Summary of a Method For Determining the
Military Worth of Spare Parts", Naval Research Logistics Quarterly
,
Vol. 7 (I960), p. 234.
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The techniques developed through the military worth studies,
with gradual improvement of the method of measuring military worth,
will find many future applications in the military decision-making
process. Present techniques can be applied to system-stocking and
echeloning of supply policies, to the provisioning or initial procure-
ment of parts policies ; and to determine the preference ranking of
equipments for the schedules maintenance of Allowance Parts Lists on
these equipments * These are but a few of the possible future appli-
cations o With the development of METRI, as we shall see in the
succeeding chapter, even more significant possibilites are developed.




MILITARY ESSENTIALITY THROUGH READINESS INDICIES (METRl)
THE PROBLEM
One of the major problem areas in the Navy today is lack of an
adequate readiness measure and a reporting and evaluation system of
weapon system readiness. This lack of an adequate readiness measure
has caused decisions to be made on funding aspects which effect the
support of weapons systems without an awareness of,, understanding of,
or a means of, determing the ultimate affects of such actions. Ad-
ditionally, because there is no rigorous, objective method for indicating
weapon systems readiness, decisions on determining ship or other weapon
systems overhaul schedules or deterining when to strike a ship from the
active list is less than optimal. Judgements of performance are made
as to effects on immediate problems rather than against over-all Navy-
wide standards of readiness requirements
.
READINESS
Naval readiness is the total product of Naval Logistics, thus de-
pends on integration of matters of: personnel, material supply, avail-
ability, obsolescence, and deterioration as these are defined in their
2
broad connotation. At the core of Naval readiness is naval ship readi-
ness . Ship readiness can be defined as that quality or state of a Naval
"TIaterial Management Study Group, Material Management Study
,
Vol. I (Department of Navy, 1962), p. 191.
^J.E. Hamilton, Ship Material Readiness , Report Serial T-145




ship whereby it is prepared for use or action of any kind which might
3develop in war, or preparatory to, or training for war at any timer
OBSOLESCENCE AND DETERIORATION
Of the five factors affecting Naval readiness, two require
additional explanation . Obsolescence is defined as the departure in
design capabilities of a ship or other weapon system as it exists at
any time from the best which could be on hand with full exploitation
of the state of the art. Measurement of obsolescence is the means of
telling what a ship is capable of doing if there is no deterioration
„
Deterioration is defined as the departure of the material in a ship or
other weapon system from the brand new state or design capabilities and
4
is a measure of reliability for future utilization. Reliability is the
probability of a system or equipment operating without failure for a re-
quired critical time. Measurement of deterioration is the means of tell-
ing how well a ship may be expected to perform within its designed limi-
5tations. Obsolescence is fought by local maintenance and by overhaul.
Mills has further described the state of deterioration as follows i
As material (repair parts, provisions, fuel, etc.) is con-
sumed-( fails, wears out, is used, etc)- it is replaced.
During the time it takes to replace the failed or used
item, the ship is in a degraded state. The degree of
degradation depends upon (l) the time to repair, a main-




. , p. 2.
^Ibid ., p. 139.
-'For an informative Study on obsolescence and deterioration and its
relation to material readiness and its effect on military essentiality
see QlsQ o
6H.F. Mills, "Military Essentiality", Newsletter
.
March 1963, p. 1.
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It is the measure of this degradation of relative material readiness
which we are seeking . Datum for the measurement will be the brand new
condition of the ship.
CURRENT METHOD OF MEASURING MATERIAL READINESS
The current measurement of the material readiness of ships , on
which various decisions are made as to mission assignment and overhaul
schedules , is based on two documental active sources of information.
One is the INSURV report, which is a report of an inspection by the
Board of Inspection and Survey at approximately two year intervals
.
The inspection determines the ship's physical deterioration . The second
source document is the Casualty Report and is a report of material
failures occuring aboard ship» It is submitted on an "as occuring"
basis and serves as a guide to the ship's physical condition between
INSURV inspections . Both of these reports serve only as rough approx-
imations of ships readiness.
A NEW APPROACH
The material readines-for-war of a ship is a function of its
physical condition, its status as to provisions, stores, and ammunition^
of the completeness of its allowance list of repair parts and of its
7
personnel. Ship readiness being a function of these variables then a
measure or index of readiness could be developed, if a method represen-
tation or model could be devised to express the relationship or connection
to the ship as a whole. This measure would reflect the readiness of the
7Logistics Research Project, George Washington University, Survey
of Command Logistics Problems (Report Serial T-161, I963), p. 20.
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essential elements making up the whole . The index would incorporate
the well-defined variables which affect the material readiness-for-war
of the ship in some measurable amount . It would also incorporate the
Military Essentiality of a unit of consideration in terms of the effect
of its failure on a particular mission. An approach to the development
of such an index of material readiness which reflects the physical con-
dition of the ship has been developed by Clark, Cooper, Field and Uohl,
9
Incorporated, under the guidance of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.
The method is called Military Essentiality Through Readiness Indicies.
It is a program for relating readiness of the fleet with its supporting
items in simulated form to provide important decision-making information
on problems of military essentiality and readiness,, The ultimate ob-
jective is to get intelligence regarding the readiness of force units
at any one time, how readiness might be improved, and the extent that
10
individual components affect readiness.
METHOD
Clark, et aj. , briefly describe their method as follows:
METRI involves the construction of an engineering model that
functionally describes the operation of a force unit such as
a ship. The model is nothing more than a vector chart, or
series of charts, that shows how each item in a force unit
contributes to its overall mission. When the model is com-
pleted, it is converted into a series of equations which are
then put into a computer where they produce or simulate oper-
ation of the force unit. In this way, the effect of each in-
dividual item in the force unit can be traced in a system-wide
8
Ibid .
'Clark, Cooper, Field and Wohl Incorporated, METRI Interim




fashion o How a unit affects other units and the force unit
as a whole can be determined. Various combinations of item
performance or failure of one or more to perform can be traced
as tested. The simulated model of the force unit will repro-
duce in a short period of time experience that would take many
years of conventional operation. **-
A STEP FORWARD
The METRI concept is an out-growth of earlier work on material
essentiality done by the Logistics Research Project, George Washington
University, and represents an additional step forward. The development
of the concept was done principally aboard the USS Brownson, A more
specific explanation of the METRI as it applied to ship follows*
THE HIERARCHY STRUCTURE
A ship can have one mission or more than one mission, some or all
12
of which may be of a continuing nature. The readiness of the ship
to perform its mission can be related to the various sub-systems acting
as a total system. The sub-systems can in turn be broken down into
equipment and so forth, decending the ship's hierarch, a level at a time,
until the individual bits and pieces are reached. In this manner parts
performance can be related to mission performance through a structured
13
set of hierarchical functional relationships. Since each item in the
hierarchy, starting at the top, depends upon the performance of items
at the next lower level, the entire ship structure can be reproduced in
both chart form and mathematically. Readiness to perform a mission can,
i:LIbid
. , p. 2.
12
For development of the weighting factors of the missions for a
multi-mission ship see^$l^J .
^Mills, o£. eit .. p. 2.
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therefore, be expressed by a mathematical relationship that links items
of support to mission through the intervening ship structure.
THE MODEL
At the heart of the METRI concept is a sophisticated type of
engineering model* The model realistically shows how all items in a
system are inter=related and how each affects the total system. The
model is developed from a charting system in symbolic form which por-
trays accurately the functional relationships of all the parts that go
to make the total system. The building blccks of this charting system
are three kinds of structures, embracing six classes of relationships.
The three types of structures are Delta, "V", and "X", while the classes
of relationships are supplements, complements, alternatives, sequences,
coordinates, and collaterals. Additionally, there are some underlying
15
axicms or assumptions. This functional model of the ship developed
through charting is then expressed in mathematical form. The formulas
are then computerized to provide a wide range of information regarding
readiness and material essentiality. With the computerized model, sim-
ulated readiness under varying operating conditions can be done making
it possible to predict events and conditions, so that corrective courses
of action can be planned. The measurement of material essentiality is
accomplished by varying the state of readiness of the inputs and deter-
mining affect on the total readiness of the ship; therefore in this case
essentiality of an item is the degree to which it affects overall
Clark, etal., op_. cit., p. 3«
15
For further explanations of the structures, relationships,
and axioms see Q/iQ .
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readiness. Conversely, readiness is the sum total of essential services
provided by components and other input items . Thus, the model clearly
shows that essentiality can not be considered without considering readi-
ness, and conversely, readiness can not be considered without taking
into account essential contributions of subordinate items. Readiness
measuresthen become an expression of a percentage of designed capability
for a specific operating condition and in relation to a specified
mission.
ABSOLUTE VS. RELATIVE READINESS
METRI can measure the affects of four of the factors contributing
to readiness, but it can not measure obsolescence. Additionally, METRI
only measures relative readiness, and absolute readiness. Clark, et
al. make the following statement concerning this important aspect of
readiness:
Readiness has two critical aspects, namely, absolute readiness
and relative readiness. Absolute readiness deals with strategy
and combat command. It pertains to overall strength and how
that strength compares with possible combinations of enemy
strength. Relative readiness deals with the strength of a
given force system. It is the percentage of full design or
other designated capability that a force has at a specific
time. It is largely a matter pertaining to such factors as
the condition of equipment, staffing of force units, and
adequacy of funds. 17
FURTHER APPLICATIONS
This concept cr technique for relating readiness of a ship with
its supporting sub-systems to determine vital information both on
readiness of the ship and on essentiality of supply items can be further
Clark, etal., op_. cit




implemented up in the heirarchy to include entire force units. Even
at its present stage of development METRI can provide a wealth of in-
formation to assist in planning and budgeting and in command and logis-
tical decisions. With further development it will enable naval com-
manders to determine how ready a force unit is to meet a given mission^
point out the best way to bring a force unit up to a given state of
readiness, and will show in rank order the essentiality of supply items
needed to do this. The budgereers will be furnished with information
relating readiness to various levels of funding. Maintenance personnel
will receive intelligence regarding the trade-off of reliability and
inventory back-up. Ship designers will gain valuable insights into
the functional operations of force units and how they relate to one
18 19
another in carrying out a mission. * 7
Because of its sophistication and complexity, further extension
of METRI above the ship level will be costly. Also, keeping charts
current will present a trememdous problem. METRI is being extended to
all destroyers of Destroyer Squadron 32. Also, METRI is being dove-
tailed with the Standard Navy Maintenance Management System (SNMMS) to
the greatest extent possible ; however, METRI is primarily an information
system to provide data regarding material essentiality and its affect
on readiness while SNMMS is a program to raise the level of ship's
readiness through maintenance actions.
CURRENT STATUS OF METRI
The METRI project has now been designated Project Number NT-F-
015-01 under the cognizance of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. It
Clark, et al., ojo. cit., p. 1.
19 ,- -,
For additional applications of METRI see (_13j > PP" 93-95.
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is divided into nine sub-projects entitled as follows: Complete USS
Ellison Model, Investigate Application of METRI Model to Inventory-
Systems, Investigate Application of METRI Model to Operational Readiness
Systems, Investigate Application of METRI Model to Maintenance Systems,
Investigate Application of METRI Model to Personnel Systems, Investi-
gate Application of METRI Model to Budgeting Systems, Investigate
Application of METRI Model to Design Systems, Evaluate Extension of
METRI Model to All Forces Afloat, and Evaluate Integrated Systems. The
first eight subprojects are concerned with the actual modeling of ships.
The first subproject is concerned with the actual modeling of a proto-
type ship. The eighth listed subproject examines the feasibility and
cost of modeling all ships. The second through the seventh are con-
cerned with the various applications of the ship models. In these,
each application is investigated independently as though the models were
to be applied to it alone. The last subproject listed will examine
systems which consider all applications simultaneously. In addition
to these applications it is believed that the basic METRI concept can
be applied to some Joint Chief of Staff and Department of Defense type
problems such as readiness reporting, and in such a way as to provide
a conceptually uniform system throughout the Military Establishment.
Several phases of each of the subprojects have been completed and
the prospects for further applications are very promising. The ultim-
ate object of the project will be the specification of methods and sys-
tems which will improve decisions in many areas, including operations,





The military decision-maker of today is faced with many complex
decisions and problems requiring specific solutions. The military
complexities of the problem have superimposed upon them economic,
political, moral, social, and technological complexities. The sheer
size of the problems and the extreme national importance of making
correct military decisions can not be overemphasized, as they may
affect our safety and very survival as individuals and as a nation.
Static considerations are complex enough, but when time and the un-
certainty of future events are introduced as another element of the
problem it becomes even more complex. In many cases this uncertainty
is not a simple case of risk and an associated probability, but con-
sists of true uncertainties of outcomes of various decisions and of
actions and reactions of the enemy.
The general nature of the problem facing the military decision-
maker is that he has certain fixed resources which, according to the
state of technological development, may be combined to give certain
alternatives by which he can reach his stated objective or mission.
These alternatives may either be infeasible, feasible, efficient or
optimal. If he wishes to accomplish the objective by the minimum use
of resources then he would wish to choose the optimal alternative or
optimal combination of alternatives.
The consideration of all the variables and possible alternatives
and the weighing of their significance on the problem at hand in order
to arrive at an optimal decision is beyond the ability of the human
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mind. These problems must be reduced to manageable proportions and
feasible courses of action found, which may only be sub-optimal and
subject to effects of spillovers and their attendant error possibil-
ities. Although in the past many of the decisions were made solely
on intuitive judgment, the development of modern tools and techniques
of managerial analysis and decision-making enable these intuitive
judgments to be altered or strengthened by a more structured approach.
Intuition and judgement are being supplemented with systematization
and substantiation through investigations of measurable quantities
that can either support, extend or contradict the intuitive judgement.
These structured approaches to military decisions and problems consist
mainly of the scientific method and economic analysis.
There cannot be any valid presumption regarding the universal and
uniform applicability of the scientific method and economic analysis
in the field of military decision-making; however, these techniques
provide useful and valuable means of structuring the decision making
process until some more suitable method is developed. Structuring
the decision process and quantifying those variables that can be
quantified with reasonable accuracy, will provide additional insight
into the problems of the military decision-maker and provide models of
the system which will be more descriptive and predictive, and will lead
to more rational and consistant decisions. In making rational decisions,
the aspect of military worth, cost, quality and time must be weighted
and integrated into the analysis of alternatives.
Because there is no unique correct solution to military decision
problems, given the present state of the art, the structured methods
are only an aid in this process and not a substitute for common sense
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and sound experienced judgment. The military decision-maker must not
loose sight of the importance of the factors or variables that remain
unmeasured and the assumptions that lie behind the quantification of
the measured variables. He must continue to examine ways of improving
his choice of payoffs and his criteria of judging the relative merits
of alternatives. He must keep abreast of the advancements in the
sciences of economics, mathematics, statistics, and electronic data
processing which have resulted in the development of theories and
techniques that have special application in the solution of complex
problems peculiar to modern military management in all of its rami-
fications .
At the heart of the structured method is the selection and mea-
surement of suitable criteria. Criteria are tests by which one al-
ternative output or system is chosen over another. Criteria may also
be defined as the practical counterparts or approximate indicators of,
or substitutes for, the function which the decision-maker would like
to maximize in choosing among alternative courses of action. In de-
veloping criteria the decision-maker is trying to develop scales of
effectiveness
.
Criteria may take many forms. A criterion may be factual or value
or a combination of both. The aim is the answering of the right ques-
tion and the selection of an optimal solution. In many cases appli-
cation of a criterion may result in selection of an efficient system,
relying on the intuitive judgements of a well-informed decision-maker
to select one of the efficient systems in the neighorhood of the op-
timum.
Selection of an appropriate criterion is a difficult task. In the
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business world, the business entrepreneur has selected the objective
of maximizing profit. The criterion used to measure the accomplishment
of this objective is dollars. The market system and its associated
pricing structure provides a great deal of free information expressed
in the common denominator of dollars . The military decision-maker has
as his objective victory in war, but he has no comparable mechanism at
his disposal with a convenient common denominator of dollars to measure
alternative methods in obtaining tris objective. It is difficult to
express value of different weapons systems for completing some mission.
Many weapons systems have not yet been tried. In any event, decisions
must be made on the basis of some idea of the relative importance of
the various objectives. The appropriate criterion would be military
worth or military value. In years past little effort was made to
quantify military worth, but developments in utility theory and prob-
ability theory, improvement of measurement techniques, and development
in mathematical formulations have given added emphasis to the possible
quantification of subjective data. Much of this work is still in the
initial stages of being transformed into a practical tool for military
decision-making
.
If we are going to measure military worth, values or utilities,
a scale must be devised to represent these values so that various com-
parisons and mathematical manipulations can be made with these values.
Measurement scales may be selected by comparing the analytical demand
to be made upon them. Two important analytical features of a scale are
its operational character and its descriptive power or information pro-
vided by the scale values. Three basic types of scales starting with
the one possessing the least analytical potential are nominal, ordinal
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and cardinal, which may further be subdivided into interval and ratio
scales. The use of one scale rather than another is determined by the
problem to be approached and the analytical potential required, and not
by the method used as a basis for constructing the scale.
Military worth may be conceived as a subdivision of the more gen-
eral field of worth and value. Presently there is no universally ap-
plicable definition of military worth. It greatly depends on the
level of command at which it is being used, the context of the problem,
or the criteria used to measure it. At the national level it may be de-
fined in terms of contribution to winning or deterring some kind of war.
At the level of the individual military decision-maker, it may be de-
scribed as his preference for, or amount of satisfaction he receives
from, having a certain military entity (the concept of utility
theory). While the terms military worth and military value are used
in many cases interchangeably, they are two separate concepts.
The concept of military value may be related to the phenomenon of
choice. Military value may be defined as that which determines choice.
By defining military value in this manner, a quality of the individual
rather than an inherent quality in an object or entity is being sought.
The aspect of the military value dimension which describes the indivi-
duals disposition towards an object may be called preference. An im-
portant fact to focus upon is that preference determines choice and not
the size of the number chosen to represent preference. Habit, custom,
military experience, training, tastes and preference may all bt con-
sidered important influences on the choice of a military decision-maker.
Analytically it is at present convenient to aggregate all factors con-
tributing to the choice decision of an individual decision-maker into
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the single concept of military value.
The concept of military worth may be related to that quality or
sum of qualities of an entity rendering it essential, valuable, or
useful. Military worth then may be understood to mean physical util-
ity of various alternatives. Military value is related to military
worth in that value is the estimated or assessed worth, usefulness,
or essentiality an individual places upon an entity. Military value
judgements may be arbitrary, and in a sense conventions of the time
and place, but are mainly based on the military worth and imputed im-
portance of an alternative.
The ideas of military worth and military value have proven diffi-
cult to formalize because they are not absolute, because they have not
yielded to a single scale of measure, because of countless possibilities
of exchange or trade-off in measures of value which vary with circum-
stances, and because it has not been possible in most cases to disso-
ciate moral ana social value from material values. The development of
a suitable procedure to measure military worth or value would be a sig-
nificant step forward in the evaluation of alternatives and in improved
decision-making. In approaching this problem of formalization and mea-
surement of military value or worth two basic questions must be answered.
Who (in the case of value) or what (in the case of worth) should be mea-
sured? How should value and worth be measured and in relation to what?
The answer to the question of who is to be measured in the measure-
ment of military value depends on the problem being considered. How to
measure military value or preference may be approached by two aspects,
introspection and behaviorism. The introspection method uses verbal
responses of individuals involved to certain questions to develop
96

military value scales. Behaviorism measures military value by certain
actions of the individual, such as presenting an individual with an
array of objects or entities to choose from.
A third methodology, formalized by VonNeumann and Morgenstern,
called Gaming Theory, may be used to develop weak interval scales of
military value. To understand this method, it must be realized that
there are three choice contexts as follows: (1) certainty where the
outcome of a choice is known, (2) risk , where a given choice implies
several possible outcomes, each associated with a known probability
distribution, and (3) uncertainty , where the form of the probability
distribution is unknown. The Game Theory methodology develops military
value scales which are generalized such that they would indicate the
choice of an individual under conditions of risk. The basic assumption
behind the generalization is that for each person there exist numerical
constraints, called utilities, associated with the various possible
outcomes of his actions, given the external events not under his con-
trol. The Game Theory scales make no statement concerning the indi-
viduals feelings toward an object. Rather, they assume certain
rational consistencies in his behavior, namely that he seeks to maximize
his expected utility or military value and the ability to represent
behavior through the use of choice scales.
There are various approaches and methods that are used in measur-
ing military worth depending on the problem and the amount of informa-
tion and operational characteristics the measure must provide. Here
again we must answer the questions What to measure and how to measure
the selected criterion or criteria? In this economic approach two
elements, cost and effectiveness (or quality), are considered when
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evaluating an alternative . Effectiveness may be physical utility or
combination of physical utilities, such as expected kill, target de-
struction^ etc If multiple criteria are used to evaluate effective-
ness, then generally some weighted factor will have to be assigned to
each, to derive over-all effectiveness . The goal is to optimize the
physical utility within the constraints of the problem or system. We
say we are trying to optimize military effectiveness, but this is ob-
viously a subjective idea rather than an objective, physical, measured
utility. This method substitutes some set of physical measurable util-
ities which it is hoped represents a true element of effectiveness.
The measure should reflect some fundamental attribute, the more be sic
the better, since otherwise an essential index could hardly be expected
to result.
Using the structured method and the measurement techniques dis-
cussed above, military value and military worth may be quantified. By
thus making these subjective concepts objective, they can be predic-
tive, descriptive or optimized. At least trends can be seen and mea-
sured to determine if we are moving in the right direction. These nu-
merical measures can be manipulated by mathematical use of systematic
methods for calculating the effects of several variables, brining ex-
plictly to light assumptions underlying the analysis, and providing in-
sights into the problem. Insights give clearer perception of the trade-
offs made in weapons decisions, and explicit recognition of these trade-
offs in actual program decisions may provide substantial benefits in
terms of improving the allocation of national defense resources.
It must be kept in mind, however, that military worth or value
evaluation and measurement is highly sensitive to the manner in which
98

worth or value information is treated . If arbitrary numerical values
are employed, the evaluation of a model used to develop and test al-
ternatives will be strongly dependent on these numerical values. With
different numerical values, a particular alternative may appear better
or worse than another . For example, if an ordinal measurement system
is used it would be difficult to determine how many low-worth entities
are equivalent to a high-worth entity. This is the problem of aggre-
gation of micro-military values to obtain macro-military values with
the many complicated interfaces and interrelationships in and among
various alternatives. For these reasons, and in order to assess the
usefulness of military worth or value scales, the decision-maker must
be aware of the significance of the numerical measures being used to
represent military worth or value and the assumptions that were made in
the development of the scales giving rise to these numerical measures.
Generally, no absolute value of military worth prevails or is discern-
ible at this time, only a relative value developed as entities are
brought into comparison with one another, which means that only trends
are measurable at this time.
Interest in the military worth and value concept has been shar-
pened through the emergence of appropriate analytical tools in deal-
ing with military worth, through the identification of problems which
submit, with realism, to formal mathematical treatment, and through
the growing awareness of its importance. Some general military decision
problems which may effectively use military worth measures in their
solution are the evaluation and selection of weapons systems, military
operations, and executive control systems. Generally, all that is re-
quired in these problems is to rank the various alternatives by military
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value or military worth. The military worth or value of these alter-
natives could be evaluated by the methods previously discussed: how-
ever an additional aspect in measuring military worth and value is seen
in a method suggested by Peck and Scherer.
Peck has proposed the construction of a military worth function
based on a comparison of the quality of one nation's weapon systems
relative to the quality of its rival's systems. This is based on the
concept that the military value of a weapon system depends upon the
quality of counterpart weapons possessed by the enemy, and brings into
play the factor of obsolescence. Obsolescence is defined as the depar-
ture in design capabilities of a weapon system as it exists at any time
from the best which could be on hand with full exploitation of the state
of the art. To accomplish the ranking of weapons it is necessary to
formulate a military worth function reflecting this relativity notion
in conjunction with corresponding possibility curves of time, cost and
quality associated with each weapon system. Peck accomplishes this
through a parity function from which military worth may be measured.
In this case military worth is broadly defined in terms of the contri-
bution a weapon system makes to the maintenance of peace or the pros-
ecution of warfare. Weapons systems can now be ranked on a priority
ladder according to their net military worth as obtained from the parity
function.
In addition to these general applications, military worth measures
may be effectively used in military logistics problems such as in the
J.M. Peck and F.M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process :
An Economic Analysis (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1962).
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development of priorities, in the improvement of equipment allocation,
and in inventory control* The application of the military v orth con-
cept has proved very fruitful and is at present findings its greatest
application in the area of inventory control „ Generally, military
worth or value in this area is called military essentiality and is
broadly defined as the importance a repair part, equipment, ships, etc,
has in relation to the accomplishment of a stated mission or missions or
in relation to the readiness of a unit to accomplish its missions.
A significant feature of the inventory problem in the military
establishment is its very close connection with the problem of military
worth or strategic value . Inventories are held in order to support
some current strategic plan and to permit the feasibility of future
and uncertain strategic plans j therefore not all items are of equal im-
portance or have the same military worth. The importance of the ob-
jective or mission will determine their importance. From this it is
apparent that military worth plays an important role in logistic plan-
ning and requirements determination.
The complexity of the military inventory problem is without
parallel in civilian industry. Before any importance military decisions
on inventory levels can be made, certain basic assumptions must be made
about the probability of war and the time and duration of the war.
Next, the objectives must be stated. The objective of the Naval Supply
System is to improve the capability of the Navy to destroy enemy tar~
gets in war. In this effort, the readiness of weapons systems depends
on reliability and maintainability of the equipment comprising the
system. Maintainability is in turn a function of both supply and
maintenance. The lack of immediate or extremely rapio accessibility of
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some items of military equipment or repair parts could in some cases be
as serious as its nonexistence and could cause consequences of an ex-
tremely grave nature , This cost of depletion must be carefully analyzed.
For this reason, the higher the military essentiality of an item the
closer to the end-user should be the inventory support. Thus one factor
to be considered in the echeloning of supplies certainly should be military
essentiality of the items . The capability of the Navy could be improved
by proper echeloning of the material inventory. This is true because
the closer an item is to the end-user, the less elapsed time there is
in filling the user's order, consequently there is an increase in readi-
ness.
The introduction of even a crude military essentiality system into
the supply system should certainly lead to the establishment of inven-
tory levels more in accordance with the strategic importance of various
items. Goods might be divided into categories where depletion was of
vital importance, of moderate importance, and of little importance.
Probability figures could then be assigned to each of these major cat-
egories, expressing to some extent these varying degrees of importance.
Failure to do even this rough approximation of the importance of in-
ventory items is to implicitly postulate that all items in an inventory
system are of equal worth or essentiality under all situations.
The basic approach in developing the military essentiality of re-
pair parts has been through the use of a questionnaire and psychometric
scaling techniques to quantify the answers to the questionnaire. The
questionnaires are directed at two levels, at the command level to de-
termine the effect of an equipment loss on the mission of the unit, and
at the maintenance level to determine the effect of a part failure on
102

the operation of the equipment , This approach to stocking repair parts
based on military essentiality was brought about because the demand for
individual repair parts was extremely low and sporadic, because there
was practically no commonality of usage between individual units in
terms of actual items used, and because no direct relationship between
operational variables, such as steaming hours or flying hours, and de-
mand rate could be determined.
The use of the military essentiality techniques has proven highly
successful, particularly in developing allowance lists for Polaris sub-
marines. In addition, military essentiality aboard ship can be used
to determine the priority of preventative maintenance schedules, to
determine the priority of planned overhaul work requests, to evaluate
casualty reporting, to evaluate repair parts readiness, to improve
allowance lists and to provide improved budget requests. It demon-
strates that something specific can be done concerning military worth
and that it need not remain as one of the intangibles in military pro-
blems, particularly in inventory control.
A logical extension of military essentiality coding is the devel-
opment of the project METRI (Military Essentiality Through Readiness
Indicies). Basically, METRI relates readiness of the fleet with its
supporting items by an engineering model in simulated form to provide
important decision-making information on problems of military essen-
tiality and readiness. The ultimate objective is to get intelligence
regarding the readiness of force units at any one time, how readiness
might be improved, and the extent to which individual components affect
readiness. METRI will enable naval commanders to determine how ready a
force unit is to meet a given mission, point out the best way to bring
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a force unit up to a given state of readiness, and will show in rank
order the essentiality of supply items needed to do this. The bud-
geteers will be furnished with information relating readiness to various
levels of funding*, Maintenance personnel will receive intelligence re-
garding the trade-off of reliability and inventory back-up . Ship de -
signers will gain valuable insights into the functional operations of
force units and how they relate to one another in carrying out a mission.
METRI may also find application to some Department of Defense type prob-
lems such as readiness reporting, and in such a way as to provide a
conceptually uniform system through-out the military establishment.
METRI has three disadvantages. Because of its sophistication and
complexity, extension of the method above the unit level will be expen-
sive. The task of keeping the engineering model current will be a tre-
mendous problem. Finally, METRI does not provide information on obso-
lescence. There exists a need to measure the relationship of one weapon
system in relationship to other weapons systems and in relation to the
enemy's weapons systems. METRI does not provide this and the use of
monetary criteria is too limited, since it leaves out of account the
military worth of alternative defense schemes. Calculating military
value on a parity basis over time leads to the important conclusion
that the United States must be prepared for the worst at all times by
having a diversified inventory of weapons as technically advanced as
possible.
There still remains the continuing task of clarification of the
military worth concept as well as the derivation and application of
military-worth measurement. It was the intent of this review to bring
together in one source some of the current developments in the concept
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of military worth and to show the many and varied applications that can
be made of military worth measures. While the military worth problem
is complex, this is at least matched by the importance of doing some-
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OUTLINE OF A STRUCTURED METHOD OF DECISION MAKING
The following outline is a structured method of dealing with de-
cision problems. The detail and extent to which a decision maker will
want to go into each step of the procedure will depend on the problem
being considered, on the time available for its consideration and solu-
tion, and on the staff personnel available to the decision-maker. The
recommended procedure is
:
A. To clearly and logically state objectives with a description 01 the
assumptions on which they are based,
B. To become aware of the problem,,
C. To make a precise statement of the problem and the assumptions made,
D. To establish a solution criterion or a measurement of success,
E. To collect pertinent data relevant to t.,e problem by
1. Experimental iiethods,
2. Observational Methods, and/or
3. Statistical Methods,
F„ To sort and analyze the data so as to produce a hypothesis, which




The usefulness of the model is determined by its benefit and not neces-
sarily by its exact representation of the real world,
G, To formulate a solution to the hypothesis by testing the model in
rredicting results in v-.rious circumstances ind with various parameters,
H. To survey alternative solutions,
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I. To establish controls or parameters of the solution,
J. To test the hypothesis with current data. The Lest of the hypothe-
sis may be conducted at three levels:
1. Common Sense Level-Trial und Error
2, Empirical Level-Statistical Data
3o Scientific Level-Experimentation and observation.
K. To implement the hypothesis by putting the solution to work,






MOD M TOOLS OR TECHNIQUES UitfD IN DEALING WITH COMPLEX PROBLEMS l
A, TOOLS FOR COPING WITH COMPLEXITY
1. mathematical Programming . These are basically static coj iider-
ations. Linear programming is a member of this family.
2. D./n • ti-ii c Pro grarmrdng . The time element is introduced.
J> %a, ib'., lie Logi c, This is a method of putting decisions into
symbols to determine logical consistancy in an end savor to make decisions
more rational.
k. Factor analysis . This is a method of determining key elements
of a complicated problem by factoring or breaking it down into its
essential 3 irts.
3. TOOLS FOR COPING WITH VARIABILITY
1. Probaoility Theory . This theory m kes use of various density
functions
.
2. 'ueuinr Theory ('.'aiting Line Problem s). Use of this theory can




do Line Balancing Problems.
C. TOO.uS FOR COPING WITH LACK oF INFOBiATION
1. Sampling
.
2. Statistical Inferenc >s 5 "^he problem here is in determining
whether there is lack of information, rather than variability. There
Mames P. Cowie, "modern Tools or Techniques Used in Dealing with
Co:, tplr!x Problems , "(lecture delivered at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate




a. Test of Significance,
b. Design of Experiments,
c. Analysis of Variance.
3. Nonte Carlo Analysis , This method uses random events and simu-
lation by use of random number tables or some other random number gener-
ator in studying various problems.
4° Simulation . Simulation may be in the form of numbers or mathe-
matical formulas. Electronic Data Processing has greatly added to the
usefulness of this tool,
D. MISCELLANEOUS T00L3,
1. Replacement Processes . A process of evaluating decisions to re-
place capital equipment b..sed on cost, probabilities, life of equipment,
and estimates of action by competition.
2. Scientific Inventory Analysis .
3. Network Analysis . This is a useful tool in production-management,
program-man i ~ement , or in considering routine problems. The most promi-
nent example of this technique is PERT.
4. Informati on Theory .
5. Econometrics . This is a combination of j.iati.ematics and economics,
using utility theory, marginal analysis, and other economic analysis tech-
nioues. It is a Quantitative approach to economics.
6. Differential Calculus and l-i -trix Algebra .
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. . . 2 OIX G
'i IE FACTOR . 'ITHOD i.F LCOI >TIC 1 l .. I II G
Factor
1. Military Activity (Independent
Potential, e.g., days without
support)
2. Commodity Consumption (Conversion
Factor)
j. Judgement Factor (To reflect ex-
pected deviations from the stand-
ard conditions)
Basic ne .surement
1. Some unit of activity such
as flight hours or steaming
hours.
2. Units of material consumed
per unit of activity.
J . Estimation of Milit try Ac-
tivity. Measures degree or
extent of military activity
necessary for some planned
operation.





FOUR FACTOR METHOD CF LOGISTIC PLANKING
Factor
1. Protection Level (PL)
2. Military Essentiality (ME)
3. Usage Estimates (UiT)
4. Opportunities For Usage (OU)
Basic Measurement
1. Probability of the loss of
a specified unit of the task
force or ship.
2. Measurement of relative im-
portance of each kind of
material has on mission limi-
tation due to non-availabil-
ity of the item.
3
.
Expected number of expendi-
tures for each kind of ma-
terial per unit per unit-
mission time period.
4. Number of units in task
force for which material re-
quired and possible rates of
usage.
Expected Requirements = PL X ME X UE X OU
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